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PORNOGRAPHY  AND  THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
CASS  R.  SUNSTEIN*
The  problem  of  pornography  has  reappeared  on  the  national
agenda.  Feminist approaches  to the subject, based on novel arguments
and rejecting traditional definitions of "obscenity,"'  have resulted in leg-
islation in Indianapolis 2 and significant  efforts in other cities.3  The At-
torney  General's Commission on Pornography has recently  supported a
national attack on pornography, adopting an amalgam of traditional and
feminist objections to sexually explicit materials.4  Particularly in light of
the growth of the pornography industry, 5 the issue seems certain to pro-
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1.  See MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 321,  322-24 (1984)  (distin-
guishing "the  male morality  of liberalism and  obscenity  law from  a feminist political  critique  of
pornography");  see also A. DWORKIN,  PORNOGRAPHY:  MEN  POSSESSING  WOMEN 9  (1981)  ("Ob-
scenity is not a synonym for  pornography.").
2.  See INDIANAPOLIS,  IND., Cry-CoUNTY GEN.  ORDINANCES  ch.  16 (1984), quoted in AT-
TORNEY  GENERAL'S  COMM'N  ON  PORNOGRAPHY,  U.S.  DEP'T  OF  JUSTICE,  FINAL  REPORT  392
(1986)  [hereinafter  FINAL REPORT].
3.  Antipornography  legislation has been proposed in Cambridge, Los Angeles, and Minneapo-
lis.  See  FINAL REPORT, supra note  2, at 392.  The mayor of Minneapolis  has twice  vetoed  anti-
pornography  measures  passed  by  the Minneapolis  City  Council.  See  The Proposed Minneapolis
Pornography  Ordinance: Pornography  Regulation Versus Civil Rights or Pornography  Regulation as
Civil Rights?, 11  WM. MITCHELL  L. REV. 39,  44 & n.6 (1985)  (symposium).
4.  FINAL REPORT, supra note 2.  For a critique of the Commission's work, see Fields, ACLU
Issues Critique of Pornography  Commission, PUB.  WEEKLY, Mar.  14,  1986, at  11.
5.  The Commission concluded that "[t]here can be little doubt that there has within the last
ten  to twenty  years  been  a dramatic  increase in  the size  of the industry  producing the kinds  of
sexually  explicit materials that would generally be conceded  to be pornographic."  FINAL REPORT,
supra note  2, at 284.DUKE LAW JOURNAL
duce controversy  in coming years.6
It should not be surprising that discussions of antipornography  reg-
ulation7 often refer to Herbert Wechsler's famous essay on neutral princi-
ples.8  Despite the essay's  impact on first amendment theory, the notion
of neutral principles has never been altogether clear.9  It is possible, how-
ever, to distinguish weak and strong versions of the basic idea.
The weak version requires each judge to undertake  an internal So-
cratic dialogue in order to  ensure that a particular decision  can be har-
monized  with other  decisions  that have  been  made  and that might be
made.  Thus  understood,  the notion of neutrality  is  designed  to ensure
that judges do not simply implement whatever intuitions they happen to
have, but that they  order and  make coherent  those  intuitions  through
reasoning by analogy.  Although one might question whether this version
of neutral principles imposes  sharp constraints  on judges, it has in fact
been a basis for invalidating recent antipornography  legislation.' 0
The strong version of neutral principles is associated,  in Wechsler's
own formulation, with severe doubt about the correctness of the result in
Brown v. Board ofEducation.II Under the strong version, judges should
not care "whose  ox is gored"  by a particular result; they should be indif-
ferent to  "who  the loser is"  in  an important,  substantive  sense.  Thus
understood,  the commitment  to neutral  principles  is  a  commitment  to
abstraction  or formality  in  the law.  This  version  of neutral principles
6.  For examples of the popular debate, see The Place of Pornography,  HARPER'S,  Nov.  1984,
at 31; Pornography: Love or Death?, FILM  COMMENT,  Nov.-Dec.  1984, at 29;  The  War Against
Pornography,  NEWSWEEK,  Mar.  18,  1985,  at 58.
7.  See, eg., MacKinnon,  Pornography,  Civil Rights, and  Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
1, 4 n.6 (1985).
8.  See  Wechsler,  Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional  Law,  73  HARV.  L.  REV.  1
(1959).
9.  See  Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47  IND.  L.J.  1, 20
(1977)  (noting that requirement of neutral principles has not led the Supreme Court to accept any
tenable,  consistent theory regarding scope of constitutional protection of free speech); Greenawalt,
The Enduring  Significance of Neutral  Principles, 78  COLUM.  L. REV. 982,  1001-13  (1978)  (finding
absence of definitive guidance  for judges in resolving conflicts between adherence  to neutral princi-
ples and fulfillment  of other judicial  responsibilities);  Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A
Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96  HARV.  L. REv.  781,  821-22  (1983)  ("Each
proposed definition [of neutral principles] left us with judges who could enforce their personal values
unconstrained  by the suggested  version  of the neutrality requirement.").
10.  See American Booksellers  Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327-32 (7th Cir. 1985)  (pornog-
raphy analyzed  as protected  speech through  analogy to clearly protected  speech  such as  political
ideology), af#'d,  106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986);  see also Stone, Anti-Pornography  Legislation as Viewpoint-
Discrimination, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y  461,  463  (1986)  (noting that Supreme  Court applies
stringent viewpoint-based  standards  even to legislation  that is only indirectly  viewpoint-based).
11.  349  U.S. 294 (1955).
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figures quite prominently in  modem attacks  on affirmative  action.12  It
also plays an important role in recent discussions of pornography. 13  One
court recently rejected the feminist argument for antipornography legis-
lation on the ground  that the legislation  was an  attempt to suppress  a
viewpoint on a public issue--a central first amendment evil. 14  This view
has a powerful constitutional  pedigree.15
This  article  will  discuss the problem  of pornography  with special
attention to the nature and desirability of "viewpoint neutrality"  in first
amendment  adjudication.  In the process,  it will touch on quite general
themes associated with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.
Part I argues that pornography is a significant social problem that justi-
fies legal  concern.' 6  Part II contends that pornography is  "low-value"
speech, entitled  to  less  protection from government  control  than most
forms of speech.  This analysis, in conjunction with the analysis in Part I,
supports the general position that pornography, narrowly defined, can be
regulated consistently with the first amendment.' 7  Part III examines and
rejects the argument that antipornography  regulation is unconstitutional
because it regulates on the basis of "content"  or "viewpoint."'18  Part IV
analyzes the arguments of those who would defend antipornography leg-
islation by attacking first amendment "neutrality"  doctrine'9  and by as-
serting that antipornography  regulation actually enhances free speech.20
Part  V  explores  some  possible  limitations  of  the  reach  of  anti-
pornography regulation.
2'
I.  PORNOGRAPHY,  OBSCENITY,  AND  HARMS
Defining  pornography is notoriously  difficult; indeed, the difficulty
of definition  is  a familiar  problem in  any  attempt to  design  acceptable
regulation.  I will argue, however, that a definition can be framed so as to
12.  See, eg.,  Van  Alstyne, Rites of  Passage:  Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution,  46
U. CHI. L. REv. 775,  802 (1979)  (only way to avoid giving Constitution an "accordianlike"  quality is
to refuse to  allow discrimination on basis of race).
13.  See Note, Effects of Violent Pornography,  8 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SoC.  CHANGE  225,  236-37
(1979)  (arguing that state must remain neutral about content of speech, including pornography, if it
is to adhere to moral  rationale of first amendment).
14.  See American  Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323,  329-31 (7th Cir. 1985) (conclud-
ing that even though materials depict subordination  of women, first amendment precludes restriction
of pornographic  "speech"), aft'd, 106 S. Ct.  1172 (1986).
15.  See infra note  116.
16.  See infra notes 22-79 and  accompanying text.
17.  See infra nots 80-111  and accompanying  text.
18.  See infra notes  112-55 and accompanying  text.
19.  See infra notes  156-87 and accompanying  text.
20.  See infra notes  188-91  and accompanying  text.
21.  See infra notes  191-98 and accompanying  text.
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include only properly regulable materials.  In short, regulable pornogra-
phy must (a) be sexually explicit, (b)  depict women as enjoying or deserv-
ing some form of physical  abuse, and (c)  have the purpose and  effect  of
producing sexual arousal.
This definition draws on feminist approaches  to the problem of por-
nography and represents a departure from current law, which is directed
at "obscenity."'22  Though built-in  ambiguities  are inevitable  in light  of
the limitations of language, the basic concept should not be obscure.  The
central concern  is that pornography both sexualizes  violence and defines
women as sexually subordinate to men.23 Pornographic materials feature
rape, explicitly  or implicitly,  as a fundamental  theme.24  This  definition
differs from the approach urged by the Attorney  General's  Commission
on Pornography,  which  operated  within  conventional  obscenity  law.2 5
The definition is somewhat narrower than the one suggested by the Indi-
anapolis ordinance,  which created liability for graphic,  sexually  explicit
subordination  of women  as "sexual  objects.' " 26  The  approach proposed
here excludes  sexually  explicit  materials that  do  not sexualize  violence
against women,  and it ties  the definition  closely  to the  principal harms
caused  by  pornography.27  The  definition,  therefore,  excludes  the  vast
range of materials that are not sexually  explicit but that do contain im-
plicit  rape  themes.  The  requirement  of sexual  explicitness  is  thus  a
22.  See American  Booksellers  Ass'n v. Hudnut,  771 F.2d  323,  324-27  (7th Cir.  1985), aff'd,
106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986).  The Supreme Court's obscenity  doctrine has drawn heavy  criticism from a
Justice, see Ginzburg  v.  United  States,  383  U.S.  463,  498  (1966)  (Stewart,  J.,  dissenting)  (first
amendment  means that people  should  not be sent to prison "merely  for distributing  publications
which offend  a judge's aesthetic  sensibilities"), as well as from commentators, see Henkin,  Morals
and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63  COLUM.  L. REV.  391,  395  (1963)  (arguing that ob-
scenity is suppressed  not for the "protection of others,"  but merely  for the "purity of the commu-
nity"  and the "salvation and welfare of the 'consumer'  "); Richards, Free  Speech and Obscenity Law:
Toward a Moral  Theory of the FirstAmendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv.  45, 73  (1974) (arguing that an
understanding  of moral  function of first amendment  would lead  to protection of obscenity).
23.  See MacKinnon, Pornography  as Sex Discrimination,  4 LAW & INEQUALITY 38,41  (1986).
24.  Rape includes both sexual intercourse compelled by force and  sexual intercourse with  im-
paired,  unconscious,  or underage  females.  See MODEL  PENAL  CODE  § 213.1  (Proposed  Official
Draft 1962).
25.  FINAL  REPORT, supra note 2,  at 376-77.
26.  See INDIANAPOLIS,  IND.,  CITY-COUNTY  GEN.  ORDINANCES  ch.  16  (1984), quoted it  FI-
NAL  REPORT, supra note  2, at 392.
27.  There  is empirical  support for drawing a distinction between  violent and nonviolent  sexu-
ally  explicit materials.  Edward Donnerstein,  reviewing empirical  studies, concludes  that  although
drawing a "straightforward,  definitive"  conclusion about the relationship between  pornography and
aggression  is "difficult  to make,"  it appears that "the aggressive content of pornography...  is the
main  contributor to  violence against  women."  Donnerstein,  Pornography: Its Effect  on  Violence
Against Women, in PORNOGRAPHY  AND  SEXUAL  AGGRESSION  53, 78-79  (N. Malamuth & E. Don-
nerstein eds.  1984) [hereinafter PORNOGRAPHY  AND  SEXUAL AGGRESSION]; see also H. EYSENCK &
D. NIAs,  SEX,  VIOLENCE  AND  THE MEDIA  (1978)  (concluding  that link between  violence in media
and  behavior is better established than link between portrayals  of sex  in media and behavior).
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means of confining  the definition.28  Part of the definition, moreover, re-
quires that the appeal of the materials be noncognitive29-hence  the re-
quirement that the purpose and effect be to produce sexual arousal.
Examples  of  pornography  as  defined  here  can  be  found  in  such
magazines  as Hustler and numerous  "adult"  movies.30  It is difficult to
capture the nature of genuine pornography without presenting examples.
One  such  example  is the  "Beaver  Hunters"  advertisement  in Hustler,
which shows a nude woman strapped to the top of a car; the copy below
the photograph  states that the woman would be "stuffed and mounted"
as  soon as  the "hunters"  got her home.3 1  But pornographic  materials
cannot  always  be easily  characterized  as  such.  There  is  a  continuum
from  the most violent forms  of pornography  to materials that to some
degree  sexualize  violence  but  cause  little harm  and  are  not low-value
speech.32  Many popular movies and novels that combine  eroticism and
domination should  be protected under  the first  amendment.33  A  com-
mon plot in both books and films involves a romantic encounter in which
a woman  initially  resists  a  forcible  sexual  assault  and  then  submits.34
Although harmful, such materials do not fall within the definition of por-
nography used here.  Of course, there will be difficult intermediate cases;
but as with other forms of expression not entitled to full first amendment
protection, the fact that the relevant class is difficult to define is not itself
a sufficient  reason to proscribe government regulation.3 5
28.  The requirement is justified as a rough and imperfect means of limiting the regulable cate-
gory to speech that is of low first amendment value, see infra notes  80-11  and accompanying  text,
and that is likely to cause harm.  See infra notes 41-79 and accompanying  text.  Furthermore, sexu-
ally explicit  speech  of the sort  described  here  involves a  highly  distinctive relationship  between
speaker and user.  See infra notes  101-04 and  accompanying text.
29.  See infra notes  101-04  and accompanying  text.
30.  The Final  Report of the Attorney General's  Commission on  Pornography provides  a de-
tailed description  of one such film, Forgive Me-I Have Sinned.  FINAL  REPORT, supra note 2, at
1668-93.  See also Dietz, Pornographic  Imagery and Prevalence  of Paraphilia,  139 AM.  J. PSYCHIA-
TRY  1493,  1495  (1982)  (17.2%  of the covers of pornographic magazine  surveyed in New York City
were explicitly devoted  to violent themes such as bondage and domination).
31.  This advertisement  is discussed in A. DWORKIN,  supra note  1, at 25-30.  Consider as well
the titles of various pornographic magazines:  Black Tit and Body Torture, Tit Torture Photos, Chair
Bondage  See  MacKinnon, supra note  23, at 41  n.73.
32.  For a readable  account of the historical  roots  of the distinction between  violent porno-
graphic feature films and so-called "mainstream"  films, see Slade, Violence in the Hard-Core  Porno-
graphic  Film: A  Historical  Survey, J. COMM.,  Summer  1984, at  148.
33.  Such materials are much  harder to classify as "low-value,"  see infra notes 80-111  and ac-
companying text, and less likely to cause harms.  See infra notes 41-79  and accompanying text.
34.  Such a scene occurred in the movie Straw Dogs (Amerbroco  1971).  The mainstream actor
Dustin Hoffman starred in the movie, though he did not appear in the assault scene.
35.  The Supreme Court, for example, has adopted  a case-by-case, fact-specific  approach in de-
ciding the validity of government regulation of broadcasts involving  "indecent speech."  See FCC v.
Pacifica Found.,  438 U.S. 726,  750 (1978).DUKE  LAW JOURNAL
In light of the highly segregated nature of the pornography industry,
most pornographic  material  will  in practice  be less difficult  to identify
than it might at first seem.36  Nonetheless, I deal with possible limitations
on the definition below.37  And in using this definition, I do not mean to
endorse  the details  of any  particular form  of current  antipornography
legislation;  I do mean, however, to point to the same concerns that have
prompted such legislation.
The  initial  question  is  whether pornography,  as  defined  here,  is  a
cause  for social concern.  Until recently,  it was  common to  dismiss the
case against pornography as  the product of prudishness  or inhibition,  a
kind of aesthetic distaste not grounded in concrete  showings of harm.3a
Regulation of sexually explicit material has thus been based  on its  offen-
siveness.39 Under almost any view, regulation of speech merely because
it is offensive is problematic under the first amendment.40
Only recently has  pornography come to be regarded as posing any
problem  at all  in terms  of concrete harm-and  that approach remains
controversial  in some  circles.41  Constitutional consideration  of the por-
nography problem has  almost always  been obscured  by the gender-neu-
tral  term  "obscenity."  Mirroring  the  aesthetic  concerns  referred  to
above, the Supreme Court treats  "obscenity"  as  unprotected because  it
has nothing to do with underlying first amendment purposes and hence is
not "speech"  within the meaning of that amendment.42  Under  the ap-
36.  See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 284.
37.  See infra notes  191-96 and accompanying  text.
38.  See  Copp, Pornography and Censorship: An Introductory Essay, in PORNOGRAPHY  AND
CENSORSHIP  15 (D. Copp & S.  Wendell eds.  1983)  [hereinafter PORNOGRAPHY AND  CENSORSHIP].
39.  See L. TRIBE,  AMERICAN  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  661  (1977).
40.  See T. EMERSON,  THE SYSTEM  OF FREEDOM  OF EXPRESSION  467, 499-501  (1970)  (noting
the difficulties inherent in reconciling "full protection"  view of first amendment with social interests
thought to be fostered by obscenity laws).
41.  See, eg., Hertzberg, Big Boobs  THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 14 & 21,  1986, at 21-24 (attack-
ing Final Report of Attorney General's Commission on Pornography for failing to demonstrate  that
pornography constitutes meaningful  threat to public interest).  The  Supreme Court, of course, has
said that the offensiveness of obscenity is a harm that the state may legitimately  address  in antiob-
scenity legislation.  Cf FCC v. Paeiflca Found., 438  U.S.  726, 737-38  (1978)  (holding that the FCC
could regulate the broadcast of obscene, indecent,  or profane language); see also Bethel School Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S.  Ct. 3159, 3164 (1986)  (ruling that the Constitution does not bar states from
punishing the use of vulgar and offensive  words in secondary schools).  Furthermore,  in New York
v. Ferber, 458  U.S. 747, 756-64 (1982), the Court drew a connection between  the production of child
pornography  and violence and held that the state  may regulate child  pornography.
42.  See, eg., Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413  U.S.  49,  56 (1973)  (holding  that "obscene"
material not protected by first amendment);  Miller v. California,  413 U.S.  15,  23-24 (1973)  (same);
Roth v. United  States,  354 U.S.  476, 481  (1957)  (federal statute criminalizing  "obscenity"  was not
violative of first amendment); Chaplinsky  v. New  Hampshire, 315  U.S.  568,  571-72  (1942)  (certain
classes of speech  such as "the lewd  and the obscene"  not afforded  first amendment  protection).
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proach set forth in Miller v.  California,  43  materials can be regulated  as
"obscene"  when they:  (1) taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient inter-
est, (2) portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, measured by
"contemporary  community  standards,"  and  (3)  taken  as  a whole,  lack
serious  social value,  whether  literary,  artistic,  political,  or  scientific.44
Under the Court's approach to obscenity, sexually explicit materials  can
be regulated  merely because  of environmental  or aesthetic  harms,  and
considerations of gender are irrelevant.45
An approach  directed at pornography differs  in important respects
from one directed at obscenity.  The term "obscenity"  refers to indecency
and  filth;  the  term  pornography-derived  from  the  Greek  word  for
"writing  about whores"-refers to materials that treat women as prosti-
tutes and that focus on the role of women in providing sexual pleasure to
men.46  The underlying rationale for regulation therefore differs depend-
ing on the definition involved,  and the coverage  of regulation will differ
somewhat  as well.  In contrast to the vague basis of the obscenity  doc-
trine, the reasoning behind antipornography  legislation is found in three
categories  of concrete,  gender-related  harms:  harms to those who par-
ticipate  in the production of pornography,  harms to the victims of sex
crimes that would not have been committed in the absence of pornogra-
phy,  and harms to  society through social  conditioning that fosters  dis-
crimination and other unlawful activities.47  Although it is not possible to
describe all the available data here, some of the relevant evidence can be
outlined.
First, pornography  harms  those  women who  are coerced into  and
brutalized in the process of producing  pornography.  Evidence of these
harms  is  only beginning  to come to light.  But in many  cases,  women,
mostly very young and often the victims of sexual abuse as children, are
forced into pornography  and brutally mistreated thereafter.48  The par-
ticipants have been beaten, forced to commit sex acts, imprisoned, bound
and gagged,  and tortured.49  Abuses appear  widespread.50
43.  413  U.S.  15  (1973).
44.  Id. at 24.
45.  See Emerson, Pornography  and the First  Amendment:  A Reply to Professor MacKinnon, 3
YALE L. & PoL'y REv.  130,  134 (1984) (aesthetic harms should not be the basis of suppressing  acts
of expression).
46.  See generally A. DWORKIN, supra note  1, at 199-202; MacKinnon, supra note 7,  at 20-22.
47.  See  MacKinnon,  supra  note  7,  at  32-60  (similarly  categorizing  the harms  caused  by
pornography).
48.  Numerous examples of abuse were reported to the Attorney General's Commission on Por-
nography.  See  FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 856-69.
49.  See id. at 866-69.
50.  See generally id. at 767-86 (summarizing testimony  of women, men, and children concern-
ing  the way pornography contributed  to their  physical and psychological injuries).
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The usual remedy  in such situations  is to regulate  the conduct  di-
rectly-as current  law in fact does-rather than to regulate  the expres-
sion.51  Thus,  for example,  the  state  might  enforce  civil  and  criminal
remedies against assault, kidnapping, and sexual abuse rather than direct
the force of law against the pornographic materials themselves.  Banning
the unlawful conduct, however, is unlikely to eliminate it in light of the
enormous  profits to be made from pornography  and the  difficulty  and
cost of ferreting  out and punishing particular  abuses.52  The case for  a
ban on these materials depends on a conclusion that abusive practices are
widespread and that elimination of financial incentives is the only way to
control those  practices.  The  Supreme Court endorsed  this  view  in the
context of child pornography in New  York  v. Ferber. 53
Because the people to be protected are women rather than children,
however, the claim of universal legal involuntariness  is untenable.  Many
women  participate  in  the production of pornography  "voluntarily"  as
that term is ordinarily understood in the law.  But some of them do not,
and others are subject to grotesque abuse thereafter.54  These considera-
tions support regulation  of the materials themselves.
This justification for regulation may point to one of two conclusions.
First,  one might  conclude that the government  should be permitted  to
ban the distribution of those materials that have been produced through
unlawful means.55 Thus, for example, scenes that involve actual rape, or
51.  For example, although  under most circumstances  the right to advocate the forcible  over-
throw of the government is  protected by the first amendment, see  Brandenburg v. Ohio,  395  U.S.
444, 447-48 (1969)  (per curiam), concrete acts designed to carry out such a plan would violate a host
of federal and state statutes.  Similarly, although the use, possession,  and sale of marijuana remains
illegal in almost every state, the activities of groups such as the National Organization for Reform  of
Marijuana  Laws are  protected, even  though the positions  they advocate  may give  an implied  en-
dorsement  to violation of current law.
52.  To  be sure, creative  use of civil and  criminal  law  might help  remedy  the problem.  The
creation  of civil  causes of action,  with large punitive damages  and attorney  fees, would  be an im-
provement  over the current system.  But the pornography industry,  as noted by the Supreme Court
in New  York  v. Ferber,  458 U.S.  747,  749  n.1  (1982),  is a highly profitable  enterprise,  and  it is
unlikely that such actions  would be sufficient.
53.  458 U.S. 747,  761-62  (1982).  The Court  stated:
The advertising and selling of child pornography  provide an economic motive for and are
thus an integral part of the production of such materials, an activity illegal throughout the
Nation.  "It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom  for speech and press
extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of
a  valid criminal  statute."
Id. (quoting Giboney  v. Empire  Storage & Ice Co.,  336 U.S. 490, 498  (1949))  (footnote  omitted).
54.  See  FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at  866.
55.  In  Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs.  v. Tourism  Co.,  106 S. Ct. 2968,  2977-78  (1986),  the
Court held that states could, as a lesser included power, ban the advertising of activities that could
be made unlawful.  In the Pentagon  Papers case, New York Times  v. United  States, 403  U.S.  713
(1971)  (per curiam),  by comparison, the Court permitted publication of material that had been ob-
tained though unlawful means.  Potential or actual  illegality in the production of information,  there-PORNOGRAPHY
that  are  the product  of coercion,  might  be  actionable. 5 6  Second,  one
might conclude that the distribution of pornography generally should be
regulated through civil or criminal  sanctions as a less  expensive way  of
eliminating the problem of coercion and mistreatment.5 7
The second  harmful effect that pornography produces  is a general
increase in sexual violence directed against women, violence that would
not have  occurred but for the massive  circulation  of pornography.  To
say that there is such a connection is not to say that pornography lies at
the root of most  sexual  violence.  Nor is it to  say that most or even a
significant percentage  of men will perpetrate  acts of sexual violence as a
result of exposure to pornography.  But it is to say that the existence  of
pornography increases  the aggregate level of sexual violence.  Pornogra-
phy is at least as much a symptom as  a cause;  but it is a  cause as well.
The methodological problems in proving causation are considerable.
Even if direct causation  in fact existed, it would  be difficult to demon-
strate; undoubtedly there are multiple causes of sexual violence.  In these
circumstances  the burden of proof becomes  critical.  If legislators  may
not regulate pornography in the absence of an unimpeachable showing of
proof, they simply cannot regulate it; current data are insufficient to sup-
fore, does not necessarily license regulation of the speech rather than the underlying conduct.  Id.  at
722 (Douglas, J., concurring).  But New York Times involved a prior restraint on material that lies at
the center of first amendment  concern.  Id  at 717 (Black, I., concurring).  In contrast, pornography
is close to the commercial  speech  at issue in Posadas and even closer to the child  pornography at
issue in Ferber. But see American  Booksellers  Ass'n v. Hudnut,  771  F.2d  323,  332-33  (7th Cir.
1985)  (declaring ordinance banning distribution  of material depicting  coerced  performances  to be
unconstitutional  on ground that it was based  on defective definition of pornography), aff'd, 106  S.
Ct.  1172  (1986).
56.  See American Booksellers  Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d  323, 332 (7th Cir. 1985)  ("[WMhen  a
state has a strong interest in forbidding the conduct that makes up a film.  ..  it may restrict or forbid
dissemination  of the film  in order to reinforce the prohibition of the conduct."), aff'd, 106  S.  Ct.
1172  (1986).
57.  In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,  756  (1982), the Supreme Court sanctioned suppres-
sion of child pornography as an indirect though effective way to prevent the abuse of children in the
production of pornographic materials.  Obscenity can be constitutionally regulated  through  zoning
ordinances,  see  City  of Renton  v.  Playtime  Theatres,  Inc.,  106  S.  Ct. 925  (1986),  and by  penal
statutes,  see, e.g.,  N.C.  GEN.  STAT.  § 14-190.1  (Supp.  1985).  The Indianapolis  antipornography
ordinance,  in contrast, purported to give a civil cause of action to persons injured by pornography.
See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 324 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 106  S. Ct. 1172
(1986).
The Attorney General's Commission on Pornography  compiled a readily accessible and fairly
extensive body of testimony showing a link between  the production of pornography  and law-break-
ing. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2,  at 852-69.  This consideration suggests that another alterna-
tive might  be to regulate or prohibit the  production  of pornography  in the first instance-just  as
states generally ban prostitution  (though that ban is infrequently enforced in practice).  A ban on the
production  of pornography-as  opposed  to  a ban  on its distribution-should  not  raise significant
first amendment  issues.  But see Stone, supra note  10, at 461 (contending that because the definition
of pornography  is viewpoint-based,  regulation  is insupportable).
Vol.  1986:589]DUKE LAW  JOURNAL
port such a showing.  But if highly suggestive evidence of harm suffices-
as it does in most areas of the law58-the case for regulation is powerful.
The evidence linking pornography and sexual violence falls in three cate-
gories: laboratory  studies, victim accounts, and reports based  on the ex-
perience of states  and countries that have  changed  their practices  with
respect to pornography.
Some laboratory  studies  show  a  reduced  sensitivity  to  sexual  vio-
lence on the part of men who have been exposed to pornography.5 9  Men
questioned after such  exposure seem more prepared  to accept rape and
other  forms  of violence  against  women,  to  believe  that  women  derive
pleasure from  violence,  and to associate  sex with violence;  they also re-
port a greater likelihood of committing rape themselves.60  And after be-
ing exposed to violent pornography, some men report having aggressive
sexual fantasies.61 For these reasons, some social psychologists have con-
cluded that men  exposed  to pornography have  a greater predisposition
toward rape than men who have not been exposed.62  In light of the rele-
vant  findings,  it  is  highly  plausible  to believe  that the  general climate
reinforced by pornography contributes to an increased level of sexual vio-
lence against women.
Laboratory results, however,  do not reflect the real world  with cer-
tainty.  The  decreased  sensitivity  of men may be  only temporary;  the
subjects'  reports  of the  effects  of pornography  could  be  inaccurate  or
overstated;  and other causal factors may dwarf exposure to pornography
in importance.  Though informative, the laboratory  evidence  alone does
not reveal the extent of the connection between pornography and sexual
violence.
63
58.  See infra notes 76-79  and accompanying  text.  The best example may be that of obscenity
itself.  In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413  U.S. 49, 60-61  (1973), the Supreme Court stated a rule
of judicial deference  to legislative  presumption  of harm caused  by obscenity,  noting that  the same
deference was applicable to a broad range of legislative regulation of commerce, industry, securities,
and  the like.
59.  See Zillman & Bugant, Pornography,  Sexual Callousness, and the Trivialization of Rape, J.
COMM.,  Autumn  1982,  at  10,  16-17.
60.  See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at  1005; Donnerstein, supra note 27,  at 78  (test results
show  that  massive  exposure  to pornography  leads  students  to  recommend  significantly  shorter
prison terms  for rapists).
61.  See FINAL REPORT, supra  note 2, at 979 (citing Malamuth, Rape Fantasies  as a Function of
Exposure to  Violent Sexual Stimuli, 10 ARCHIVES SEXUAL  BEHAV.  33  (1981)).
62.  See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at  1005.
63.  See Copp & Wendell, Preface to PORNOGRAPHY  AND  CENSORSHIP,  supra note  38, at  12
(concluding that relationship  beween  sex  crimes  and pornography  has not been definitively  estab-
lished);  Gray, Exposure to  Pornography  and Aggression  Toward Women:  The  Case of the Angry
Male, 29 Soc. PROBs. 387, 394 (1982)  (arguing that pornography causes sexual violence only when it
validates a preexisting anger  toward women).
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But other evidence shows an association between the growth of por-
nography in  particular  areas with increases  in rape  and other forms  of
sexual violence.  In the United States, for example, the incidence of re-
ported rape within  states is closely  correlated with the mass  circulation
of pornography.64  The liberalization of pornography laws in the United
States,  Britain, Australia,  and the Scandinavian  countries has been  ac-
companied by a rise in reported rape rates.65  This finding becomes more
striking when compared to the experience  of other countries.  In coun-
tries where pornography laws have not been liberalized, there has been a
less  steep  rise in reported  rapes.66  And in countries  where restrictions
have been adopted, reported rapes have decreased.67  The increase in re-
ported rapes, where it has occurred, has not been matched by an increase
in serious nonsexual offenses.68  Furthermore, there appears to be a tem-
poral  relationship  between  changes  in  pornography  regulation  and
changes  in the  level  of reported  rapes.69  Finally,  recent  studies  have
found a correlation between pornography and sexual violence even when
controls  are instituted for possible confounding variables, such as police
practices, propensity to report rape, and so forth.70
But  again,  these  comparisons  alone  do  not  clearly  establish  the
causal link.71  The simultaneous rise of pornography and sexual violence
64.  See  Baron &  Straus, Sexual Stratification,  Pornography  and Rape in the  United States,, in
PORNOGRAPHY  AND  SEXUAL AGGRESSION,  supra note 27, at 206.
65.  See Court, Sex and Violence:  A Ripple Effect,  in PORNOGRAPHY  AND  SEXUAL  AGGRES-
SION,  supra note 27,  at  157-67.
66.  Id.
67.  Id.
68.  Id.
69.  Id.
70.  See FINAL  REPORT, supra note 2,  at 944-46.
71.  The Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, after reviewing the available studies,
concluded  that although the reported relationship between  pornography and sexual violence seemed
"plausible,"  it could not ignore the possibility that the studies were finding a "spurious"  relationship.
Id.  at 952.  In fact, some commentators have argued that pornography  decreases the aggregate level
of sexual violence because it produces  a kind of catharsis.  See Kutchinsky, The Effect of  Easy.Avail-
ability of  Pornography  on the Incidence of  Sex Crimes: The Danish  Experience, 29 J. Soc. ISSUES 163
(1973),  reprinted in PORNOGRAPHY  AND  CENSORSHIP,  supra note 63, at 309.  The prevailing  view,
however,  is that there is "almost  no empirical  evidence"  to support  that argument.  See  Baron &
Straus, supra note 64, at 188 n.l; FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 940-42 (summarizing criticisms of
this argument).  The experience  of Denmark-which legalized pornography  in  1967 and  1969,  and
thereafter saw a  decrease  in  some types of sexual violence-is  sometimes  cited  as support  for the
catharsis  theory.  See  Kutchinsky, supra at  171.  But the incidence  of rape,  as opposed to  other
sexual  crimes, did  not decrease  in  Denmark during the relevant  period, id. at  166, suggesting  that
the data do not support the catharsis theory.  See Giglio, Pornography  in Denmark- A Public Policy
Model for the United States?, 8 COMp.  Soc. REs.  281,  297  (1985)  (concluding that empirical studies
of effect of Danish pornography laws are largely flawed and that cultural  differences, social realities,
and political factors work against adopting "Danish solution" in United States).  But cf Kutchinsky,
Pornography  and Its Effect in Denmark and the  United States: A  Rejoinder and Beyond, 8 CoMp.
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may  stem  from  some  external  factor;  it  does  not  demonstrate  beyond
doubt the existence of a causal connection.  Other social factors,  includ-
ing demographic  and  ethical trends,  may  account  for simultaneous  in-
creases  in both pornography  and violence-though  some of the studies
try to control for these possible distortions.  Objections of these sorts of
course do not disprove a connection;  they do  suggest, however, that the
empirical data are imperfect.
A final source of evidence concerning the harm caused by pornogra-
phy  is  victim testimony showing that many perpetrators  of sexual  vio-
lence use pornography.  Police reports attest to the connection, and there
is evidence  showing the relationship  between pornography  and abuse of
women.72  One  cannot  fully  appreciate  the  grotesque  nature  of these
harms  without hearing  or reading  the testimony itself.  Frequently  the
temporal and spatial connection is extremely close; pornography is some-
times  used as  a kind of "how-to"  manual  for sexual  assault.73  Recent
hearings  on  the subject before  the Attorney  General's  Commission  on
Pornography  provided  striking evidence to this effect.74
There are, of course, dangers in relying on evidence of this sort.  Re-
ports from victims tell little about the extent of the problem  and the pre-
cise nature of the causal links.  Much of the reported  violence may have
occurred without pornography.  Most consumers of pornography  do not
commit acts  of sexual  violence.  In short,  we  do not  know how  wide-
spread the phenomenon is.
We are therefore confronted with three kinds of evidence indicating
a  link between  pornography  and  violence,  all  of them  suggestive,  but
none  of them  alone  dispositive.  For critics of antipornography  regula-
tion, the problems of proof suffice to refute the existence  of a causal con-
nection  between pornography  and sexual violence.75  Uncertainty  about
Soc.  REs.  301,  319-21  (1985)  (reiterating that empirical  research  has  revealed  no  positive  causal
connection between  pornography and  sex crimes).
72.  See Champion,  Clinical  Perspectives  on the Relationship  Between Pornography  and Sexual
Violence, 4 LAW  & INEQUALITY  22,  25  (1986);  see also Silbert  & Pines, Pornography  and Sexual
Abuse of Women,  10 SEx  ROLES  857  (1984)  (study of street prostitutes suggested  relationship  be-
tween  sexual behavior  depicted  in pornography  and sexual abuse of women).
73.  See Champion, supra note 72, at 25 (referring to the use of"pornography as tools or guides
in order to initiate ...  family  members into sexual behavior,"  including father-daughter  incest; and
describing the "rape  and torture of a young wife by her husband..,  an avid consumer of sadomas-
ochistic and bondage pornography who created  a complete torture chamber in their  basement").
74.  See  FINAL  REPORT, supra note  2, at 773-80.
75.  See Lynn,  "Civil Rights" Ordinances  and the Attorney General's  Commission: New Develop-
ments in Pornography  Regulation, 21  HARV.  C.R.-C.L. L. REV.  27,  92-96  (1986).  Critics of anti-
pornography legislation may be put into two broad categories:  those who question  the link between
pornography and concrete harm (not including  offensiveness), see, e.g.,  Hertzberg, supra note 41,  at
24, and those  who take the view  that harms are  irrelevant  and that the  proper remedy  for "bad"
speech  is more speech.  See Dershowitz, Partners  Against Porn,  HARPER'S,  May  1985, at 22;  Emer-
[Vol.  1986:589PORNOGRAPHY
the nature and extent of the link, however, hardly counsels inaction.76  In
the context of carcinogens,  for example, regulatory action is undertaken
in  cases  in which  one cannot  be sure  of the precise  causal  connection
between a particular substance and cancer-even when the regulation is
extraordinarily  costly.
77  Pornography  may  be  at  least  as  harmful  as
many  carcinogens currently subject to regulation.  The analogy is close:
the nature  and extent of the link between  act and harm are difficult to
establish;  but suggestive  evidence might well,  in the face of potentially
severe harm, justify immediate governmental action.  Other areas of reg-
ulation are treated similarly.78 Inaction pending the accumulation of de-
finitive  proof has costs  of its  own.  The question,  a familiar one  in the
regulatory  context,  is  who  should bear  the burden of uncertainty:  the
pornography  industry or the potential victims of sexual violence.
A third harmful effect of pornography stems from the role it plays
as a conditioning factor in the lives of both men and women.  Pornogra-
phy acts as a filter through which men and women perceive gender roles
and relationships between the sexes.  Of course, pornography is only one
of a  number of conditioning  factors,  and  others  are  of greater  impor-
tance.  If pornography  were abolished,  sexual  inequality  would  hardly
disappear.  The connection between inequality, unlawful discrimination,
and pornography cannot be firmly established.  But pornography undeni-
ably reflects inequality, and through its reinforcing power, helps to per-
petuate it.
All  of these  factors support  the conclusion  that pornography  is  a
significant social problem-producing  serious harm, mostly to women-
and  that substantial  benefits  would result  if the pornography  industry
son, supra note 45,  at  142.  Proof of harm,  therefore,  might satisfy the former critics, but not the
latter.  The "more  speech" view is discussed below.  See infra notes  157-90 and accompanying  text.
76.  See  FINAL  REPORT, supra note 2, at 306 (concluding that  if sexually  explicit  material is
causally related to "some"  harmful behavior, the material is harmful); see also Note, Anti-Pornogra-
phy  Laws and First  Amendment  Values, 98  HARv.  L.  REv. 460,  479  (1984)  (fact that empirical
evidence is disputed should not undercut legislative determinations of harm as long as some correla-
tion is found).
77.  Consider the decision of the Occupational  Safety and Health Administration  to reduce the
level  of occupational  exposure  to benzene from  10 ppm  to 1 ppm, discussed  in Industrial  Union
Dep't  v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).  See generally S.  BREYER & R. STEWART,
ADMINISTRATIVE  LAW  AND  REGULATORY  POLICY  91  (2d ed.  1985)  (noting  wide  regulation  of
carcinogens despite disagreement over the precise objectives of safety regulation); S.  BREYER, REGU-
LATION  AND  ITs REFORM  135-40 (1982)  (noting irony of extensive regulation of carcinogens despite
lack of proof of clear causation).
78.  A particularly dramatic example is the death penalty.  The evidence showing a relationship
between the death penalty and deterrence-a prime justification for the penalty-is weaker  than the
evidence showing a relationship  between pornography  and sex-related crime.  In Kaplan v. Califor-
nia, 413 U.S.  115,  120 (1973),  the Court  recognized  the need for legislatures  to be  able  to act to
suppress obscenity  even  in the absence of any concrete evidence of harm.
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were regulated.79  It is important to recognize  that the various different
harms point to different avenues for legal regulation.  If the harm to wo-
men  who participate  in pornography  is emphasized,  regulation  will de-
pend  on whether  such harm has  occurred.  If the causal  connection  is
emphasized, the question will be whether the material at issue is likely to
cause  sexual  violence  and  subordination.  I will  return to these  issues
below.
II.  LoW-VALUE  AND  HIGH-VALUE  SPEECH
Although the harms generated by pornography  are serious, they are
insufficient,  standing  alone,  to justify regulation  under  the usual  stan-
dards applied to political speech.  After Brandenburg  v.  Ohio,  8 0 speech-
not including obscenity-  cannot be regulated because of the harm it pro-
duces unless it is shown that the speech is directed to produce harm that
is both imminent and extremely likely to occur.81  Moreover, the Court
has rejected the notion that this showing can be made by linking a class
of harm with a class of speech; it is necessary to connect particular harms
to particular  speech.82  These  doctrinal  conclusions  will  not  be  ques-
tioned here, although they do have powerful adverse implications for an-
tipornography legislation.  If current standards are applied,  a particular
pornographic  film  or magazine  might  be beyond  regulation  unless  the
harms that result from the particular  material  are imminent,  intended,
and likely to occur.  Demonstrating this,  of course, will be hard  to do.
But acceptance  of these doctrinal  conclusions  does not resolve the
question  of the  constitutionality  of  antipornography  regulation.  The
Court has drawn a distinction between speech that may be banned only
on the basis  of an extremely  powerful  showing of government interest,
and speech that may be regulated on the basis of a far less powerful dem-
onstration  of  harm.  Commercial  speech,  labor  speech,  and  possibly
group libel, for example, fall within the category of "low-value"  speech.8 3
Whether particular speech falls within the low-value category cannot be
determined by a precise test, and under any standards there will be diffi-
79.  The utilitarian  "gains"  from pornography,  as defined here,  should count  little in  the bal-
ance.  Cf. Goodin, Laundering  Preferences, in  FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  CHOICE  THEORY  75  (.
Elster & A.  Hylland eds.  1986).
80.  395 U.S. 444 (1969)  (per curiam)  (overturning conviction of Ku Klux Klan leader for advo-
cating violence at  Klan gathering).
81.  Id.  at 447.
82.  See, e.g.,  Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S.  105,  107.09  (1973)  (overturning  conviction  for disor-
derly conduct on ground that defendant's speech was neither directed toward a particular person nor
intended  to incite specific act of violence).
83.  See G. STONE,  R.  SEIDMAN,  C. SUNSTEIN  &  M. TUSHNET,  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  1058-
114 (1986).
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cult intermediate cases.  But in determining whether  speech qualifies  as
low-value,  the cases  suggest that four factors are relevant.8 4
First, the speech must be far afield from the central  concern of the
first amendment, which, broadly speaking, is effective popular control of
public affairs.  Speech that concerns governmental processes is entitled to
the highest level of protection;85  speech  that has little or nothing  to do
with public affairs may be accorded less protection.86  Second, a distinc-
tion is  drawn  between  cognitive  and  noncognitive  aspects  of speech.87
Speech that has purely noncognitive appeal will be entitled to less consti-
tutional protection.88  Third, the purpose of the speaker is relevant:  if the
speaker  is seeking  to  communicate  a message,  he will  be treated  more
84.  Because  pornography  and obscenity are obviously  "speech,"  through of low-value, the ra-
tionale of Roth v.  United States,  354 U.S. 476 (1957),  and its progeny is highly questionable.  The
notion of "no  value"  speech is also questionable when  applied  to words  and pictures.  In  general,
however, the Supreme Court's  approach to deciding what constitutes low-value speech is acceptable
and is drawn on here.
85.  See  New York Times  v. Sullivan,  376  U.S. 254, 269  (1964)  ("[The first amendment] was
fashioned  to  assure unfettered  interchange  of ideas  for the bringing about of political  and social
changes desired by the people."  (quoting Roth v. United States,  354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))).
86.  See, eg.,  Bethel School  Dist. No.  403  v. Fraser,  106  S.  Ct.  3159,  3166  (1986)  (offensive
student speech unrelated to public issues not entitled to first amendment protection).
87.  The term  "cognitive"  as used here refers  to whether the material  is intended to or does  in
fact impart knowledge in any sense.  See Finnis, 'Reason and  Passion  ":  The Constitutional  Dialectic
of Free Speech and Obscenity,  116 U. PA.  L. REV. 222,  227  (1960)  (obscenity  regarded  as lacking
social utility  because it appeals to realm of passion rather  than to realm  of intellect).
88.  The Supreme Court has tied the level of constitutional protection  afforded certain classes of
speech to their ability to transmit ideology or ideas:
There are certain  well-defined and  narrowly limited  classes of speech,  the prevention  and
punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.  These
include the lewd  and  obscene,  the profane, the libelous,  and  the insulting or  "fighting"
words-those which by  their very  utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace.  It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from  them is  clearly outweighed  by  the social interest in  order and
morality.
Chaplinsky  v. New  Hampshire,  315 U.S.  568,  571-72  (1942)  (footnotes omitted).
The Roth Court's definition of "prurient  interest" in obscenity doctrine fits comfortably into the
cognitive/noncognitive analytical framework.  Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, defined mate-
rial appealing to the "prurient  interest" as "material  having a tendency  to excite lustful thoughts."
Roth  v. United  States,  354 U.S.  476,  487  n.20 (1957).  Professor Schauer  has  suggested  that the
cognitive/noncognitive  distinction  underlies  the  Supreme  Court's  obscenity  decisions:  "[The
Court's treatment of obscenity  is consistent with a vision  that emphasizes intellectual  (and perhaps
public)  communication  and  not self-expression."  Schauer, Speech  and "Speech"-Obscenity and
"Obscenity"  An  Exercise in the Interpretation  of Constitutional  Language, 67  GEo.  L.J.  899,  932
(1979).  Schauer  ascribes to the  Court  an  intention to formulate  a  definition  of "obscenity"  that
functionally excludes  noncognitive communication  (with sexual content) from constitutional protec-
tion.  Id. at 928.  But cf Perry, Freedom of  Expression: An Essay on Theory and  Doctrine, 78  Nw.
U.L. REv.  1137,  1182  (1984)  (contending that "there is no denying that obscene pornography  con-
stitutes a political-moral  vision").  Note also that symbolic speech  often has a significant  cognitive
content.
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favorably  than if he  is not.89  Fourth,  the various  classes  of low-value
speech reflect judgments that in certain areas, government  is unlikely to
be acting for constitutionally impermissible reasons or producing consti-
tutionally  troublesome harms.  In the  cases of commercial  speech,  pri-
vate  libel,  and  fighting  words,  for example,  government  regulation  is
particularly likely to be based on legitimate reasons.  Judicial  scrutiny is
therefore more deferential  in these  areas.90
The  exclusion  of obscene  materials  from  first amendment  protec-
tion, in contrast, stems largely from an act of definition.  Obscene materi-
als, to the Court, do not count as "speech"  within the meaning of the first
amendment.91  But this definitional distinction  can be viewed  as reflect-
ing the same considerations that define the low-value speech category.  If
the materials  are defined  narrowly,  only nonpolitical  and  noncognitive
material will be prohibited.  The limitation of obscenity law to speech not
having "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value" 92 fits  com-
fortably with this understanding.
This four-factor analysis is, of course, controversial.  The distinction
between political  and nonpolitical speech,  for example,  is often unclear
and may ultimately depend on the political view of the decisionmaker.93
The  difficulty  inherent  in  such  line  drawing,  moreover,  may  support
abandoning  any  attempt  to do  so.  Perhaps more  importantly, distinc-
tions  between  cognitive  and emotive  aspects  of speech  are  thin  and in
some respects pernicious.94  Furthermore, approaches  based on the pur-
89.  See generally Wright, A Rationale  from IS.  Mill  for the Free  Speech Clause, 1985 Sup.  Cr.
REv. 149,  157 ("If  one has sent a social message, however, even if none was received, or if an entirely
different  message was received,  one has engaged  in speech,  even if imperfectly.").
90.  The adjustment of standards of review in accordance with the perception of the likelihood
of impermissible  government ends  is a familiar constitutional theme;  it underlies,  for  example, the
various  "tiers"  of equal protection  doctrine.  Compare Korematsu  v. United  States, 323  U.S.  214,
219  (1944)  (applying strict scrutiny in  upholding executive  order interning Americans  of Japanese
ancestry)  with Craig v. Boren,  429 U.S.  190,  197 (1976)  (applying intermediate  scrutiny to gender
classifications) and United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S.  166,  174-75  (1980)  (apply-
ing  rational basis standard in challenge  to social and economic  legislation).
91.  See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,481  (1957)  ("[Tjhis Court has always assumed that
obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press."); see also Schauer, supra note 88, at
926,  928.
92.  Miller v. California, 413  U.S.  15,  24 (1973).
93.  See infra notes  150-53  and accompanying  text.
94.  For example, visceral  and symbolic speech can challenge  the listener, viewer, or reader by
directly  confronting  basic beliefs  and values.  Such  speech-consider  flag burning-may  have  the
purpose and effect  of causing an emotional reaction.  The confrontation,  however, is ultimately in-
tended to have a cognitive  impact, and to cause a reexamination of those values and beliefs.  When
visceral  and symbolic  speech  is directed  at  public  affairs,  it  falls well  within  the  core of the  first
amendment and should  receive the highest constitutional protection.  See Cohen  v. California,  403
U.S.  15,  26 (1971); see also Ely, Flag  Desecration: A  Case Study of Categorization  and Balancing  in
First  Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV.  L. REV.  1482,  1482-83  (1975)  ("At first glance, however, it is
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pose of the speaker are troublesome  for familiar reasons.95  Finally, free-
dom of speech might be thought to promote self-realization  and, on that
ground, attempts to make distinctions among categories of speech might
be questioned.
96
But it would be difficult to imagine a sensible system of free expres-
sion that did not distinguish  among categories  of speech in accordance
with their importance to the underlyimg purposes of the free speech guar-
antee.  A  system that  granted  absolute protection  to  speech  would  be
unduly mechanical, treading unjustifiably on important values and goals:
consider laws forbidding  threats, bribes, misleading commercial  speech,
and conspiracies.97  Any system that recognizes the need for some regu-
lation but does not draw lines could be driven to deny full protection to
speech that merits it-because the burden of  justification imposed on the
government would have to be lightened in order  to allow regulation  of,
for example, commercial  speech, conspiracies,  and private libel.  By hy-
pothesis,  that  lighter  burden  would  have  to  be  extended  across-the-
board.98  The  alternative  would be to  apply  the standards  for political
speech to all speech, and thus to require the government to meet a test so
stringent as to preclude most forms of regulation that are currently ac-
cepted.  In these circumstances  the most  likely outcome  would be that
judgments  about low-value  would be made  tacitly, and the  articulated
rationales for decisions would fail to reflect all the factors  actually con-
sidered relevant by the court.99
hard to see why [the Court finds the issue troubling].  Laws prohibiting  flag desecration quite obvi-
ously inhibit political expression  ....  ).  This view can be associated  with feminist attacks on dis-
tinctions between  reason and emotion.  See  A. JAGGAR,  FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN  NATURE
367  (1983).
95.  See Ackerman, Beyond Carolene  Products, 98 HARV.  L. REV.  713  (1985).
96.  See, eg., Redish,  The Value of  Free  Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 625  (1982)  ("Once one
recognizes that the  primary value of free speech  is as a means of fostering individual development
and aiding the making of life-affecting decisions, the inappropriateness of distinguishing between the
value of different  types of speech  becomes clear.").
97.  Cf.  Redish, supra note 96; Redish, The Content  Distinction  in FirstAmendment  Analysis, 34
STAN. L. REV.  113,  128-39 (1982).  Professor Redish's position is that any speech that furthers a first
amendment goal of self-realization-including  obscenity  and political speech-should be protected.
This  view differs  from the well-known  "absolutist"  position,  expressed  most  forcefully by  Justice
Black in Konigsberg  v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61  (1961)  (Black, J., dissenting).  The criticisms of the
absolutist  position  have,  of course,  carried the  day.  See generally Kalven,  Upon Rereading Mr.
Justice Black on the First  Amendment,  14 UCLA L. REV.  428,  441-47 (1967).
98.  See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.  447, 456 (1978)  (noting that rule requiring
same constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech could result in lowering of
standards applied to noncommercial  speech).
99.  See Sunstein,  Government Control of  Information, 74 CALIF. L. REV.  (1986) (forthcoming);
cf.  Mendelson,  The First  Amendment and the Judicial  Process: A Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND.  L.
REV. 479, 481-82 (1964)  (determination of what types of speech are to be protected should be result
of balancing  of interests  with the primary  question being  whether the balancing  should be done
covertly or openly).
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Once it is accepted  that distinctions should be drawn among differ-
ent categories of speech, the question becomes one of identifying  an ap-
propriate basis for those distinctions.  The issue is complex,  and it will be
possible only to outline some of the important considerations here.  First,
the  distinction  between  political  and  nonpolitical  speech  is  well-estab-
lished,  and  properly  so.  The  distinction  protects  speech  that  serves  a
central function of the first amendment and precludes regulation where it
is most likely to be based on impermissible or disfavored justifications.'1'
The distinction between cognitive and noncognitive  speech  is more
difficult to defend.  This is so not only because of the existence of difficult
intermediate cases, but also because the very concept of communication
is badly misconceived if it is understood as an appeal to rational capaci-
ties alone. 1 01  But any attempt to distinguish among categories  of speech
must  start with  an  effort  to isolate  what  is uniquely  important  about
speech in the first place.  Speech  that is not intended to communicate  a
substantive  message or that is directed  solely to noncognitive capacities
may be wholly or largely without the properties that give speech its spe-
cial status.102  Subliminal advertising and hypnosis, for example, are enti-
tled to less than full first amendment protection.  Listeners or observers
will frequently draw messages from speech or conduct, whether or not it
has a communicative intent; the fact that a message may be drawn does
not  mean  that  the  speech  in  question  has  the  usual  constitutional
value.103
Under this approach,  or any plausible  variation, regulation  of por-
nography need not be justified according to standards applicable to polit-
ical speech.  The effect and intent of pornography,  as it is defined here,
are to produce sexual arousal, not in any sense to affect the course of self-
government.  Though  comprised  of words  and  pictures,  pornography
does  not have  the special  properties that single  out  speech  for  special
protection;  it is more akin to a sexual aid than a communicative expres-
sion.I°4  In terms of the distinctions made among classes of speech,  por-
100.  See infra notes  124-27  and accompanying  text.
101.  See, ag.,  I. BALBUS,  MARXISM  AND  DOMINATION:  A  NEO-HEGELIAN,  FEMINIST,  PSY-
CHOANALYTIC  THEORY OF SEXUAL,  POLITICAL AND  TECHNOLOGY  LIBERATION 231  (1982)  (criti-
cizing  J. HABERMAS,  LEGITIMATION  CRISIS  (1975),  for relying  on  a disembodied  conception  of
reason  and  failing  to  account  for  "what  might  be  called  the  psychodynamics  of  human
communication").
102.  See Schauer, supra note  88, at 920-28.
103.  See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.  367, 376 (1968)  (rejecting contention that "an appar-
ently limitless variety of conduct"  intended to convey ideas merits constitutional protection).  But ef.
American  Booksellers  Ass'n v. Hudnut,  771  F.2d 323,  330 (7th  Cir. 1985)  (stating that  failure to
protect  speech  from  which  messages  are  drawn  would  invite  government  dictation  of  "which
thoughts are good for us"), aff'd, 106 S. Ct.  1172  (1986).
104.  See Schauer, supra note  88,  at 923.
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nography  is  low-value  speech  not  entitled  to  the  same  degree  of
protection  accorded other forms of speech.
In one respect, however, the feminist case for regulation  of pornog-
raphy might seem, quite paradoxically, to weaken the argument for regu-
lation.  The  feminist  argument  is  that  pornography  represents  an
ideology,  one  that  has important  consequences  for  social  attitudes.1 0 5
Speech that amounts to an ideology,  one might argue, cannot be consid-
ered low-value,  for such speech lies at the heart of politics.  If pornogra-
phy  indeed does amount to an ideology  of male supremacy, it might be
thought to be entitled to the highest form of constitutional protection.  106
But an  argument  along these lines  is  based on a misconception  of
what entitles speech to the highest form of protection.  Child pornogra-
phy,  for example,  may  reflect an ideology, but this did not compel the
Court to hold in New York v. Ferber  107 that child pornography is consti-
tutionally protected.  Indeed, most categories of low-value speech-fight-
ing words, commercial speech, obscenity-amount in some respects to an
ideology.  In commercial  speech, for example, there is an implicit ideol-
ogy in favor of market- ordering, and perhaps  some sort of ideology  in-
volving  the  product  advertised.  But  that  fact  does  not  justify  a
conclusion  that courts  should  accord  such  speech  the highest level  of
constitutional protection.
Whether particular speech is low-value does not turn on whether the
materials  contain  an  implicit  ideology; 0 8  if it  did,  almost  all  speech
would be immunized.  The question instead turns more generally on the
speaker's purpose  and on how  the speaker  communicates  the message.
The pornographer's  purpose in disseminating  pornographic materials-
to produce sexual arousal-can be determined by the nature of the mate-
rial.  And  any  implicit  "ideology"  is  communicated  indirectly  and
noncognitively.'0 9  A distinction along these lines has become an integral
part of the Supreme Court's  commercial  speech  doctrine.  Paid speech
105.  See S.  BROWNMILLER, AGAINST  OUR WILL:  MEN, WOMEN AND  RAPE 394 (1975)  ("Por-
nography is the undiluted  essence of antifemale  propaganda.").
106.  See Stone, supra note 10, at 467 (arguing that legislation  prohibiting portrayal of women as
enjoying domination  is viewpoint-based  and thus constitutionally  repugnant).
107.  458  U.S.  747, 763-64  (1982).
108.  See Pittsburgh  Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n,  413 U.S.  376, 385 (1973)  (although
sex-designated  employment advertisements may have  expressed implicit  ideology  whether "certain
positions ought to be filled  by members of one or the other sex,"  ordinance forbidding  such adver-
tisements  did not violate newspaper's  first amendment  rights  because  advertisements were  classic
commercial speech).
109.  Even Justice Black, a first amendment "absolutist,"  believed that regulation of conduct that
also touched associated speech could, in particular circumstances, be constitutional. See Konigsberg
v. State Bar, 366 U.S.  36,  69 (1961)  (Black, J.,  dissenting) (conceding that city ordinances intended
to prevent unnecessary noise and traffic congestion that "incidentally"  touch speech are permissible).
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addressed  to social issues receives full first amendment  protection;  paid
speech proposing  specific  commercial  transactions  receives  less  protec-
tion despite any implicit political statement such speech may  contain."1 0
A contention that the purpose of the speech is to transmit an ideological
message  is easily overborne  by the nature of the speech itself.  Further-
more, the purpose of the speaker is central to the question;  someone who
burns a draft card for the purpose of protesting a war is in a very differ-
ent position  from someone  who burns a draft  card as part of a general
program  of arson,  even  if the action of the latter is taken  to  have  ex-
pressed  an ideology  to bystanders.  There are, moreover, differences  be-
tween ideological argument in favor of free markets, or of domination  of
women by men,  and commercial  and pornographic  speech.  The differ-
ences  have  to  do with both  purposes  and effects.  For pornography  in
particular, the cognitive element, to the extent that there is one, operates
at a subconscious level; the message is communicated indirectly.  Hypno-
sis, whether or not voluntary,  does not amount to constitutionally  pro-
tected  speech,  or to  speech  that is  entitled  to the highest  level of first
amendment  concern;  this  conclusion  holds  even  if  the  hypnotist's
message has some ideological dimension.  The example is extreme, but it
suggests that the fact that speech communicates a message  is not a suffi-
cient reason to accord  it the highest level of constitutional  protection.
These considerations suggest a conventional, two-stage argument for
the regulation  of pornography.  First, pornography  is entitled to only a
lower level of first amendment solicitiude.  Under any standard, pornog-
raphy  is far afield from  the kind of speech conventionally  protected by
the  first  amendment.  Second,  the  harms  produced  by  pornographic
materials  are sufficient  to justify regulation.  Admittedly,  there  will be
difficult intermediate cases and analogies that test the persuasiveness and
reach  of the argument.  The crucial  point, however,  is that traditional
first amendment doctrine furnishes the basis for an argument in favor of
restricting pornography, and that such an argument can be made without
running afoul of the weak version of the notion of neutral principles de-
scribed above.''
110.  Compare New  York Times v. Sullivan,  376 U.S.  254,  266  (1964)  (paid  political  advertis-
ment soliciting financial support for "right-to-vote"  movement expressed opinion  and communicated
information on  "matters of the highest public  interest and concern")  with Posadas  de Puerto Rico
Assocs. v. Tourism Co.,  106 S.  Ct. 2968,  2976-77 (1986)  (regulations prohibiting  advertising of ca-
sino gambling  served substantial government  interest).
111.  See supra note  10 and accompanying  text.
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III.  THE  PROBLEM  OF  VIEWPOINT  DISCRIMINATION
The only federal court of appeals that has faced a challenge to anti-
pornography legislation found it unnecessary to examine either the issue
of low-value categorization  or the issue of harms.  In American Booksell-
ers Association v. Hudnut,  112 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh  Circuit invalidated  antipornography  legislation  on the ground
that it discriminated  on the basis of viewpoint.  In the court's view, the
Indianapolis  ordinance 13 amounted  to "thought  control,"  since  it "es-
tablish[es] an approved view of women, of how they may react to sexual
encounters,  [and]  ...of how  the sexes  may  relate to  each  other."114
Under  this decision,  which the Supreme  Court  summarily  affirmed,115
neither the problem of low-value nor the problem of harm is relevant.
This basic approach is familiar in first amendment law.116  Modern
doctrine  distinguishes  among  three  categories  of restrictions:1 7  those
that are based on viewpoint, or that single out and suppress particular
opinions concerning  a particular subject; those that are based on content,
or that regulate any speech concerning a subject, regardless of viewpoint;
and those that are both  content- and viewpoint-neutral.  The  most in-
tense  constitutional hostility  is reserved  for measures  that discriminate
112.  771  F.2d 323,  332  (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 106 S.  Ct.  1172 (1986).
113.  The Indianapolis  ordinance used a somewhat different  definition of pornography  from that
set out here. See supra note 26 and accompanying  text.  But those differences  would  not affect the
applicability of the Hudnut reasoning  to regulation  using the definition  I have proposed.
114.  Hudnut, 771  F.2d at 328.
115.  Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O'Connor dissented.  Hudnut v. Amer-
ican  Booksellers  Ass'n,  106 S. Ct.  1172 (1986).
116.  The  Supreme Court,  for example,  reversed  a New  York  Court  of Appeals  decision that
upheld the prohibition of the showing on state property of a movie based on Lady Chatterley's  Lover.
See Kingsley  Int'l Pictures  Corp. v. Regents,  360 U.S.  684 (1959).  The New  York  decision  was
based on the explicit ground that the movie's subject matter---"adultery  presented as being right and
desirable for certain people"--permitted regulation.  Id  at 687.  In a concise summary of the basis of
the presumption  of unconstitutionality  of viewpoint-based  regulation,  the Court stated:
What  New York has done, therefore,  is to prevent the exhibition of a motion picture be-
cause that picture advocates an idea-that adultery  under  certain  circumstances  may be
proper behavior.  Yet  the First Amendment's  basic guarantee  is of freedom  to advocate
ideas.  The State,  quite simply, has thus  struck at the very  heart of constitutionally  pro-
tected liberty....  [The Constitution's]  guarantee is not confined to the expression of ideas
that  are conventional  or shared  by a majority.  It protects advocacy  of the opinion that
adultery  may sometimes be proper, no  less than advocacy  of socialism or the single tax.
Id. at 688-89.  Kingsley may be said to prohibit antipornography  legislation.  Yet Kingsley deals with
state suppression  of a particular point of view that was  not tightly connected to any demonstrable
harm and that applied regardless of the value of the speech in the constitutional hierarchy.  See infra
notes  124-33  and accompanying text.  In New York v. Ferber, 458  U.S.  747 (1982),  the Court  made
it clear that narrowly-tailored  harm-based regulation of low-value speech  is constitutional.  Kingsley
is thus distinguishable from a viewpoint-based challenge  to antipornography  legislation such as that
made in Hudnut, 771  F.2d at 325.
117.  See  Cornelius  v. NAACP  Legal  Defense & Educ.  Fund,  Inc.,  105 S.  Ct.  3439,  3453-54
(1985)  (distinguishing between  content- and viewpoint-based  regulation of access to public forums).
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on the basis of viewpoint, even though such measures may  suppress less
speech than do other sorts of restrictions.1 18  Thus, for example, a statute
that prohibits all speech on billboards stands a far greater chance of con-
stitutional success than a statute that prohibits speech on billboards that
is critical  of Republicans.1 19
Under a standard view,120 restrictions based on viewpoint are neces-
sarily content-based, but the converse need not always be true.  A statute
that prohibits  speech critical of the President  is directed  at both  view-
point and content;  the speaker's point of view is critical  to the sanction,
for speech supportive  of the President  is lawful.  A statute  that forbids
false commercial  advertising is said to be directed at content but not  at
viewpoint; 121  although the meaning of the words decides the legal ques-
tion,  the statute does  not appear  to  exclude  a particular point of view.
Finally, a statute that forbids all speech is directed at neither content nor
viewpoint.  Under current law, viewpoint-based restrictions are the most
difficult to justify; indeed,  they sometimes encounter a per se rule of un-
constitutionality.1 22  Content-neutral rules, in contrast, receive  the most
lenient review.  Content-based regulations  that are neutral  with respect
to viewpoint occupy  an intermediate  category.
123
The special  constitutional  hostility toward  viewpoint restrictions  is
not easy to explain,' 24 but it is generally  sound.  One reason for the hos-
tility toward viewpoint discrimination is that the government may have a
motive  for  excising  a particular point  of view that is  unrelated  to  the
public welfare; the government may excise a point of view simply because
it disagrees with it.  In this respect, viewpoint-based restrictions are likely
to embody one or the other of two central constitutional evils.  The first
evil is factional  tyranny, or the usurpation of government power by pri-
vate groups.' 25  Its first amendment  manifestation  can  be found  in laws
that censor  the speech of some  private groups in order  to promote  the
118.  See generally Stone,  Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25  WM.  & MARY  L.
REV.  189 (1983)  (discussing use of stricter scrutiny for regulations based on content as compared  to
regulations not directed  at content).
119.  See Metromedia,  Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453  U.S. 490, 514-15  (1981).
120.  See Stone, supra note  118,  at  199-200.
121.  See  Central  Hudson  Gas  & Elec.  Corp.  v. Public  Serv.  Comm'n,  447 U.S.  557,  563-64
(1980)  (regulation barring  public utility from advertising  violated first amendment  because  regula-
tion was more extensive than necessary to further valid state interest  in energy conservation).
122.  Such regulation is sometimes upheld,  however.  See infra notes  134-50 and accompanying
text.
123.  See generally Stone, supra note  10,  at  471  (viewpoint-neutral  regulations  are  not  per  se
unconstitutional  and require  lesser degree of scrutiny).
124.  See  Redish, supra note 97,  at  128-42 (discussing theoretical  and practical  awkwardness  of
multi-tiered  levels of scrutiny based  on whether regulation  is content-neutral).
125.  See  THE  FEDERALIST No.  10,  at  62 (J. Madison)  (M. Dunn  ed.  1901).
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welfare of others; a law preventing speech by opponents of court-ordered
busing would be an example.  The second evil is self-interested  represen-
tation, or efforts by  rulers  to insulate  themselves  and to promote their
interests at the expense of the ruled.126  Its first  amendment  manifesta-
tion can be found in laws designed to insulate government from criticism,
such as those that forbid editorializing against a war effort.  Restrictions
based on viewpoint are particularly likely to be associated with one or the
other of these evils; they are thus met with a high degree of skepticism.127
Viewpoint restrictions are also inconsistent with a central premise of
any system of free expression-that the usual remedy for harmful speech
is more speech rather than enforced silence.128 Thus, for example, when
government prohibits people from criticizing a war effort in the presence
of soldiers, the concern is that the government has bypassed the ordinary
processes  for decision,  which include persuasion  by other  citizens,  and
has attempted to impose  a solution  on its own.  The proper solution  in
such  a  case  is  to allow response  through  "counterspeech"  rather than
through regulation.
129
The  special  hostility  directed  at  viewpoint  restrictions-which  is
manifested  in  a  strong  presumption  of  unconstitutionality-is  thus
designed to "flush out" impermissible bases for government action.130  If
restrictions  on  speech  are  to  be  permitted,  it  must  be  because  there
are  significant  harms  that  cannot be  dealt  with  except  through  direct
restriction.  Courts impose a heavy burden of justification on government
to  demonstrate  the harm  necessary  to justify  a  viewpoint-based  regu-
lation.1
31
The United  States Court  of Appeals for the Seventh  Circuit  con-
cluded that the Indianapolis antipornography  legislation  was viewpoint-
126.  See THE  FEDERALIST  No.  51,  at 384 (J. Madison)  (M. Dunn ed.  1901);  J. ELY,  DEMO-
CRACY  AND  DISTRuST 78  (1980).
127.  But cf L.  BOLLINGER,  THE TOLERANT SOciETY  50-53  (1986)  (arguing that some view-
point-based  restrictions on speech are constitutionally  legitimate choices of "the people").
128.  See  Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.  357, 377  (1927)  (Brandeis,  J., concurring).
129.  See id.; Dennis v. United States,  341 U.S.  494, 503  (1951)  (plurality opinion) ("[T]he basis
of the First  Amendment is  the hypothesis  that speech  can  rebut speech,  propaganda  will  answer
propaganda,  free debate  of ideas will  result in the wisest governmental policies.").
130.  Analagous examples include heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause and the
contracts  clause.  See generally Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the  Constitution, 84  COLUM.  L.
REv.  1689 (1984).
131.  See  Widmar v.  Vincent, 454 U.S.  263,  269-70  (1981)  (university that attempts to exclude
religious worship and discussion  from public forum  must show compelling state interest); Branden-
burg v.  Ohio,  395 U.S.  444, 447  (1969)  ("[The constitutional  guarantees  of free  speech  and  free
press  do not permit a state  to forbid or proscribe  advocacy  of the use of force or of law  violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
to incite and produce such action.").
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based and that its defenders failed to meet that burden of  justification. 132
The legislation, in the court's view, singled out for suppression  a particu-
lar point of view by aiming  at the portrait  of male-female  relations  re-
flected in some  sexually graphic material.  One portrait is ruled  out; the
other is permitted.133  The issue of harm is irrelevant  when  restrictions
based on viewpoint  face a per se rule of illegality.
The  initial response  to a claim that antipornography  legislation  is
viewpoint-based should be straightforward.  The legislation aimed at por-
nography as defined here would be directed at harm rather than at view-
point.  Its  purpose  would  be  to  prevent  sexual  violence  and
discrimination, not to suppress expression of a point of view.  Only por-
nography-not sexist material in general or material  that reinforces no-
tions  of female  subordination-is  regulated.  Because  of its  focus  on
harm, antipornography legislation would not pose the dangers associated
with viewpoint-based restrictions.  The government, in effect, would have
concrete data to back its legitimate purposes.
This  approach  is supported  by a  recent  decision that  was  handed
down by the Supreme Court in the same week that it summarily affirmed
the Indianapolis case.  In City of  Renton v. Playtime Theatres,  Inc., 134 the
Court was faced with a statute that prohibited the showing  of sexually
explicit motion pictures within  1000 feet of any residential zone, single-
or multiple-family  dwelling,  church,  park,  or school.  The  Court  con-
cluded that the statute was content-neutral  because it was aimed not at
the substantive  message  of the  speech, but  at  its secondary  effects  on
crime rates, property values, neighborhood quality, and retail trade. The
statute's apparent content-based  character,  according to the Court, was
not troubling because the statute could be justified by reference to these
secondary  effects.  It might be said that Renton  involves  regulation  on
the basis of content rather than viewpoint-a point taken up below135-
but it is not clear how that conclusion is relevant to the issue of whether
harms rescue  a statute from  skepticism  about government  motivation.
Although the Renton decision is questionable on its facts,136 the Court's
132.  See Hudnut, 771  F.2d at 332-34.
133.  See id. at 328.
134.  106  S.  Ct.  925  (1986).  Renton may  also  represent  the continuation  of a  trend  in  the
Supreme  Court to  give  increased  deference  to  legislative  fact-finding  and  balancing  in  the  first
amendment area.  Both  New York  v. Ferber,  458  U.S. 747  (1982),  and  Kaplan  v. California,  413
U.S. 115  (1973), are noteworthy in their deference to the legislature.  Whether such deference will be
extended  outside the realm  of low-value speech, see supra notes 80-111  and accompanying  text, is
unclear.
135.  See infra notes  143-48 and accompanying  text.
136.  That harms  can  be invoked  as  a basis for regulation  should  not, as  discussed  below, be
sufficient to rescue a statute from content or viewpoint scrutiny; harms can almost always be invoked
to support statutes that exclude a point of view.  Instead, the inquiry should require consideration of
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willingness to look at possible neutral justifications is sound and coexists
uneasily with the outcome in Hudnut.
A response to this line of reasoning-and to the Renton analogy-
would  be to point  out  that viewpoint-based  restrictions  are  frequently
defended  by reference  to harm, and that the possibility of such defenses
has not been thought to rescue the restrictions from severe constitutional
scrutiny.  For  example,  the government's  defense  of a  law  prohibiting
people from criticizing a war effort in the presence of soldiers is not that
it has any hostility toward the speaker's point of view, but that it is seek-
ing to regulate  something that could seriously prejudice  the war  effort.
Despite  this  claim, the  restriction  is properly  subject to  the stringent
standards  applicable  to  viewpoint-based  restrictions.  The  reason  is
straightforward:  notwithstanding  the possible  invocation  of harm, the
government is attempting to bypass deliberative processes of the commu-
nity.  "More  speech"  and direct regulation  of unlawful conduct  should
be the preferred remedy for harms.  The risks of factional  tyranny and
self-interested representation are sufficient to justify imposing  on govern-
ment a heavy burden of showing that "more speech"  and direct regula-
tion of unlawful  conduct are inadequate responses  to the harm.
Harm-based justifications thus do not foreclose an attack on pornog-
raphy legislation as viewpoint-based.  Yet one may question the very ap-
plicability  of the notion of "viewpoint  discrimination"  in  this context.
First amendment law contains several categories of speech that are sub-
ject  to ban  or regulation  even though they  are viewpoint-based  in the
same sense that antipornography legislation is said to be.  The most obvi-
ous example can be found in labor law.
Courts have held that the first amendment permits the government
to  prohibit  employers  from  speaking  unfavorably  about  the  effects  of
unionization  in  the  period  before  a  union  election  if the  unfavorable
statements  might be interpreted as  a threat.137  In the leading  case, the
employer had suggested that the firm was not financially strong, that any
strike would result in a plant closing,  and that many employees  would
have a hard time finding alternative employment.1 3 8  Regulation of such
speech is unquestionably viewpoint-based,  for employer speech favorable
to unionization  is not proscribed.  Similarly, regulation of bribery turns
not only on content but also on point of view; one may not offer $100  to
tempt a person to commit murder, although a $100  offer to build a fence
additional  factors,  such as whether  the speech  is  low-value or  high-value.  Although  it might be
possible to distinguish between  "primary"  and "secondary"  effects of regulation,  such distinctions
seem artificial.  See Stone, Content-Neutral  Restrictions, 54 U. Cm. L. Rv. (1987)  (forthcoming).
137.  See NLRB  v. Gissel Packing Co.,  395 U.S.  575,  618-19  (1969).
138.  Id.
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is  permissible.  Prohibitions of "fighting  words"  might be  similarly un-
derstood. 139  False or misleading commercial  speech, as well as television
and  radio  advertisements  for  cigarettes  and  casinos,  are  regulable,1 40
even  though all are based on viewpoint.
Moreover,  one  may doubt  whether  the courts  would  invalidate  a
statute forbidding advocacy of the use of unlawful force to overthrow the
government  in  circumstances  in which  the standards of Brandenburg v.
Ohio 141  were met, even if the statute did not also forbid advocacy of the
use of unlawful force to perpetuate the existing government.  Such a stat-
ute is viewpoint-based  because the speaker's point of view triggers statu-
tory sanctions.  More generally, the existing law of obscenity may readily
be  regarded  as  viewpoint-based. 142  The  line  drawn by  statutes  imple-
menting Miller necessarily distinguishes between messages  on the basis of
social  attitudes toward  sexual mores.
These and other apparently viewpoint-based statutes are upheld be-
cause they respond, not to point of view, but to harms that the govern-
ment  has  power  to  prevent.  In  regulating  labor  speech,  the  Court
indicated that the government  was aiming not at viewpoint  but at coer-
cion  of employees. 143  The existence of genuine and substantial harm  al-
layed  concern  about impermissible motivation.  Significantly,  the Court
was sensitive to disparities in power that gave employer speech particular
authority.  The notion that the Labor Management Relations  Act4 4 in-
terfered  with  a  well-functioning  marketplace  of  ideas  thus  seemed
absurd. 145
In the area of bribes, threats, and fighting words, the government is
139.  See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315  U.S. 568  (1942).
140.  See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 106 S.  Ct. 2968, 2976-79 (1986)  (hold-
ing that  state's  power to bar gambling  includes the lesser  power  to ban casino  advertising,  even
where state has not banned casino gambling);  Virginia State Bd.  of Pharmacy  v.  Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc.,  425 U.S.  748, 771-73 & n.24 (1976)  (state may suppress prescription  drug
advertisements that are false and misleading or that propose illegal transactions); Capitol Broadcast-
ing Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 584 (D.D.C. 1971)  (upholding statute banning cigarette adver-
tising  on  any  medium subject  to FCC jurisdiction),  aff'd sub nom.  Capitol  Broadcasting  Co.  v.
Kliendienst, 405  U.S.  1000  (1972).
141.  395  U.S. 444, 448  (1969).
142.  See Stone, Restricting Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter
Restrictions, 46 U. CHi. L. REV.  81,  111-12 (1978).
143.  See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575,  618 (1969)  ("[A] threat of retaliation based
on  misrepresentation  and coercion  [is]  without the protection of the First Amendment.").
144.  29  U.S.C. §§  141-187  (1982).
145.  This is not to suggest that regulation  of labor speech  is uncontested.  See Getman, Labor
Law and  Free Speech:  The Curious Policy of Limited Expression, 43  MD. L. REV.  4,  16-19 (1984)
(describing  Court's distinction between  economic activity  in  the  labor cases  and  political  activity
relating  to public  issues  as "analytically  unsound,  historically inaccurate, and culturally myopic");
Posner, The Economics of  Free Speech, 20 SUFFOLK  U.L. REV.  1 (1986).
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also attempting to combat obvious harms. 146  Analysis of suppression of
speech advocating  the immediate  and violent overthrow  of the govern-
ment  would  be  similar:  the  government  is  attempting  to  eradicate  a
harm, not attempting to impose a particular point of view.  Bans on false
or misleading commercial  speech, cigarette  advertising, or casino  gam-
bling  are  analyzed  in  substantially  the same  way.147  In  the  obscenity
context, the reasoning is more obscure, but the central point remains: in
some  contexts,  statutes that  appear  to  be viewpoint-based  are justified
and accepted because of the harms involved.  The harms are so obvious
and immediate that claims that the government  is  attempting to silence
one position  in a "debate"  do not have time even  to register.148
One might go further and suggest that the distinction between  con-
tent-based  and viewpoint-based  restrictions  is  at best elusive  and more
likely nonexistent-and that the distinction  itself will  depend  on  view-
point.  Obscenity,  commercial  speech,  fighting words,  and perhaps  even
labor  speech  are  said  to involve  viewpoint-neutral  restrictions  because
the "viewpoint"  of the speaker is  deemed  irrelevant to regulation.  But
the  line drawn  by the regulation  does,  in  all  these  contexts,  depend  on
point of view.  One does not "see"  a viewpoint-based restriction when the
harms invoked in defense of a regulation are obvious and so widely sup-
ported by social consensus that they allay any concern about impermissi-
ble  government  motivation. 149  Whether  a  classification  is  viewpoint-
based thus ultimately turns on the viewpoint of the decisionmaker.15 0
It is for this reason that obscenity law is regarded as viewpoint-neu-
tral and antipornography law as viewpoint-based.  Obscenity law, partic-
ularly insofar as it is tied to community standards, is deemed "objective"
146.  The modem classification  of obscenity  as not being speech at all appears to be based at least
in part on a kind of  judicial notice by the Supreme Court of harms perceived  to flow from obscenity.
See  Roth v. United  States,  354 U.S.  476, 484-85  (1957)  (miniscule speech value of obscenity  over-
come  by interest in preserving  social order).
147.  Technically,  of course,  the analysis differs.  In the cases of fighting words and false or mis-
leading advertising,  the speech  is beyond  the first amendment if it fits the relevant  definition.  Cf
Posadas de Puerto Rico Assors. v. Tourism Co., 106 S. Ct. 2968, 2976 (1986) ("[C]ommercial speech
receives a limited form of First Amendment protection so long as it concerns a lawful activity and is
not misleading or fraudulent.").  On the other hand, the government cannot regulate casino advertis-
ing unless it shows a "substantial"  state interest.  See Posadas,  106 S.  Ct. at 2977.  In  every case,
however, the court is implicitly or explicitly weighing  a perceived state interest against the perceived
value  of the  speech  involved.  In any case, the requisite  showing  of harm does  not appear  to be
difficult to satisfy.  See id.
148.  See supra notes  143-48  and accompanying  text.
149.  The Court, for example, did not see any viewpoint-discrimination  in a ban on casino adver-
tising.  See  Posadas,  106  S.  Ct. at 2977-78.
150.  This of course  points out the connection between  epistemology  and power.  See generally
MacKinnon,  Feminism, Marxism,  Method  and the State:  An Agenda for Theory,  7  SIGNS:  J. WO-
MEN  IN  CULTURE  &  SOC'Y  515, 535-36  (1981).
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because  the class  of prohibited speech  is defined  by reference  to an ex-
isting social consensus.  Antipornography  legislation is deemed  "subjec-
tive"  because  the  prohibited  class  of speech  is  defined  by  less  widely
accepted values favoring the protection of the relatively  powerless.  But
this distinction  between  objectivity  and  subjectivity  is hard  to  sustain.
Indeed, one could imagine a world in which the harms produced by por-
nography were so widely acknowledged  and so generally condemned that
an antipornography ordinance would not be regarded as viewpoint-based
at all.
All this suggests that the problem of identifying impermissible view-
point regulation is far more complex than it at first appears.  Regulation
based on point of view  is  common  in the law.  The  terms  "viewpoint-
based"  and "viewpoint-neutral"  often represent conclusions  rather than
analytical tools.  In the easy cases,  they serve as valuable simplifying de-
vices.  But  in  the hard  cases,  further  analysis  is  needed.  Specifically,
three factors help identify impermissible viewpoint-based  legislation.
The first factor is the connection  between means and ends,  a recur-
rent theme in constitutional law.  If the harm invoked is minimal, or if it
is implausible to think that the regulation will remedy the harm, it will be
more likely that the regulation is in fact based on viewpoint.'51  The sec-
ond factor is the nature of the process by which the message is communi-
cated.  Regulation  of  harms  that  derive  from  types  of  persuasion
appealing to cognitive faculties is presumptively disfavored; more speech
is the preferred remedy here.  Regulation of antiwar speeches in the pres-
ence of soldiers is impermissible because any harm that results is derived
from persuasion.  More speech should be the solution.  Finally, whether
the speech is low- or high-value is also relevant. 152  The low-value  issue,
therefore, is not made irrelevant on the ground that antipornography leg-
islation discriminates  on the basis of viewpoint.1 53  The viewpoint  issue
depends,  in part, on whether  the speech  is low-value.  Viewpoint-based
regulation  of high-value  speech raises  especially  intense concerns  about
government motivation.
Under  these  criteria,  antipornography  legislation  is  defensible.
First, the means-ends  connection is quite close. 154  Such legislation could
be tightly targeted to the cause of the harm:  the production and dissemi-
nation  of portrayals of sexual violence.  Second, the "message"  of por-
151.  See J. ELY, supra note  126, at  106.
152.  Whether the speech occupies  a low position in first amendment hierarchy,  however, should
not be controlling.  A statute forbidding commercial advertising unfavorable  to Democrats could not
be constitutional.
153.  See Hudnut, 771  F.2d at  330-31; see also Stone, supra note  10,  at 477.
154.  See supra notes 22-79 and accompanying  text.
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nography  is  communicated  indirectly  and  not  through  rational
persuasion.  The harm it produces cannot  easily be countered by more
speech because it bypasses the process of public consideration and debate
that underlies  the concept  of the marketplace  of ideas. 155  Finally, por-
nography falls in the general category of low-value speech.  Under these
circumstances, antipornography  legislation should be regarded not as an
effort to exclude a point of view, but instead as an effort to prevent harm.
In this respect,  the best analogy is to labor speech-with the important
caveat that labor speech, which touches public affairs, is far closer to the
heart of first amendment  concern than is pornography.
The task, in short, is to sort out permissible and impermissible view-
point discrimination, and to explain the circumstances in which discrimi-
nation  arguably  on  the basis  of viewpoint  should  be  permitted.  It  is
important in this respect that efforts to regulate pornography, as defined
here, do  not interfere with deliberative  processes  at all.  By hypothesis,
pornography operates at a subconscious level,  providing a form of social
conditioning that is not analogous  to the ordinary operation of freedom
of speech.  What is  distinctive  about  pornography  is its  noncognitive
character;  though  it  amounts  to words  and pictures,  its purposes  and
effects are far from the purposes and effects that justify the special  pro-
tection accorded to  freedom  of speech.  In these circumstances,  the re-
sponse to the claim of viewpoint  discrimination is that antipornography
legislation does not pose any of the dangers that make discrimination  on
the  basis  of  viewpoint  so  troublesome.  The  three  factors  identified
above-means-ends  connection,  nature  of  the  process  by  which  the
"message"  is communicated,  and low-value--point in this direction.
This three-factor analysis does have important limitations.  Not all
materials having a noncognitive appeal are unprotected; communication,
whether  or not  political,  is  almost  always  a  mixture  of cognitive  and
noncognitive  effects.  Nor  should  viewpoint-based  restrictions  survive
constitutional  scrutiny in every  case  in which secondary  harms  can be
identified.  Finally, the harms invoked to defend antipornography legisla-
tion are  not  sufficient  to justify regulation  of political  speech,  broadly
defined.  It is the peculiar features of pornography that justify regulation:
the low-value status of the speech, the powerful showing  of harm, and
the nature  of the process by which  the message  is communicated.  For
this  reason  the case  for antipornography  legislation  survives  the weak
version of the requirement of neutral principles.
155.  It is thus incorrect to say, as have Professors Emerson and Dershowitz, that the appropriate
remedy for the harms caused by pornography should rest solely on the power of "more  speech."  See
Dershowitz, supra note 75,  at 22;  Emerson, supra note 45, at 142-43.
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IV.  SUBSTANTIVITY,  FORMALITY,  AND  THE
FREE  SPEECH GUARANTEE
The argument thus far has been somewhat technical, and it operates
within the framework of traditional  first amendment  doctrine.  But pro-
ponents of antipornography  legislation argue not  only that such legisla-
tion will combat related harms, but also that restrictions on pornography
will promote freedom of speech.  At first glance, the argument is mysteri-
ous.  Conventional  first amendment  doctrine is based  on the assumption
that restrictions on speech cannot promote freedom of expression.  As we
shall  see,  that  assumption  ultimately  stems  from  a  belief that  serious
threats  to  free  expression  come  mostly  or  exclusively  from  the public
sphere,  and that one  should  always  distinguish  the public  and  private
spheres  for purposes of first amendment analysis. 156
The  argument  that antipornography  legislation  can  promote  free
speech  touches  on  more fundamental  issues  than have  been  discussed
here thus far.  Essentially, the claim is that an attack on antipornography
legislation represents legal formalism akin to Professor Wechsler's attack
on Brown v. Board of Education.157  In both cases an abstract notion of
equality is decisive, though a substantive examination  of issues of power
and powerlessness  would lead to a conclusion that the abstract notion is
untenable.  Wechsler's view that Brown produced a conflict between two
coequal sets of associational preferences now appears quite odd.  The ar-
gument ignores  issues of substantive  power that make the social  mean-
ing-the purposes and effects-of the associational  preferences of blacks
altogether different from that of the associational  preferences of whites.
Similarly, first amendment doctrine that refuses to examine issues of sub-
stantive power and substantive powerlessness might be thought to gener-
ate an indefensible  system of expression.' 58
More concretely, the argument goes, the pornography industry is so
well-financed,  and has such power to condition men and women, that it
has the  effect of silencing the antipornography  cause  in particular  and
women  in general.  The  silencing  involved  is not the  kind of silencing
associated with totalitarian  regimes.  Instead, women who would engage
156.  This point suggests  the close connection  between  the antipornography  debate  and  recent
discussions involving the problem of "state action."  See L. TRIBE,  CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 256-
59  (1985).
157.  See Wechsler, supra note 8,  at 32-34.
158.  See  Dworkin, Against the Male Flood:  Censorship, Pornography and Equality, 8 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 13-17 (1985).  The general attack on legal formalism described here resembles  that
set out in B. ACKERMAN,  RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN  LAW 96-101,  110 (1984);  Brest, State Ac-
tion and  Liberal Theory:  A Casenote  on Flagg Brothers  v. Brooks,  130 U. PA. L. REV.  1296  (1982);
and Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv.  L. REV.  1685,  1776-78
(1976).
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in "more  speech"  to counter  pornography  are denied  credibility, trust,
and the opportunity to be heard-the predicates of free expression.  The
notion that "when  she says  no,  she means  yes"-a common theme  in
pornography-thus  affects the social reception of the feminist attack on
pornography.  Understood in this way, the case for antipornography  leg-
islation is a version of the arguments derived from the famous footnote in
United States v.  Carolene Products. 159  Legal intervention is required be-
cause of a maldistribution  of private power that interferes  with a well-
functioning political marketplace. 16 0  Akin to the view that correction of
market failures is a valid basis for governmental intervention, 161 the ar-
gument might be understood as a variation of traditional justifications for
affirmative action.162
Thus stated, the argument  has a long academic pedigree in writing
about freedom of speech,163 and it is reflected in recent legal commentary
expressing skepticism about the free market in ideas164-though its appli-
cation to the gender context  is new.165  The debate is not foreign to the
courts.  Related issues have reached the Supreme Court in several cases.
In Buckley  v.  Valeo, 166 a limitation on campaign expenditures  by polit-
ical candidates  was defended  in  part on the ground that the limitation
would equalize access  to the political process.  In the view of the lower
court,  the  restriction  promoted  rather  than  undermined  freedom  of
speech. 167  Disparities in wealth enabled some to drown out the voices of
others, and restrictions on the speech of the wealthy served the interest of
disseminating information from diverse and antagonistic sources.1 68  The
Supreme  Court, however,  overturned  the lower court  decision  and re-
jected this justification,  stating that "the  concept  that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment."'169
159.  304 U.S.  144,  152 n.4 (1938).
160.  See Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of  Ideology and Legal Reform,  96 HARV.
L. REV.  1497,  1516-18  (1983).
161.  See, e.g.,  Hawaii  Hous. Auth.  v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,  242  (1984).
162.  For an exposition  of those justifications,  see Kaplan, Equal Justice in an  Unequal World:
Equality  for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 60 Nw. U.L.  REV. 363,  364-67  (1966).
163.  See,  eg.,  R. WOLFF, B. MOORE, JR. &  H.  MARCUSE,  A CRITIQUE OF  PURE TOLERANCE
(1968).
164.  See, eg.,  Baker, Scope of the First  Amendment Freedom of  Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV.  964,
967-81  (1978)  (arguing  that  marketplace  is  biased  in  favor  of groups  having  greater  access  and
greater opportunity to speak); Ingber, The Marketplace ofIdeas: A Legitimizing Myth,  1984 DUKE
L.J.  1, 22-24  (arguing against notion  of a market in speech).
165.  See  MacKinnon, supra note  7, at 5-8.
166.  424 U.S.  1 (1976).
167.  Buckley v. Valeo,  519  F.2d 821,  841  (D.C. Cir.  1975) (en bane).
168.  Id.  at  841.
169.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49.
Vol.  1986:589]DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Equalization of political participation through restrictions of the speech
of the wealthy was,  in the Court's view, constitutionally  unacceptable.
The reasoning in Red Lion Broadcasting  Company v.  FCC,  170 how-
ever, suggests that in some circumstances government regulation may be
constitutionally acceptable,  or perhaps  even  constitutionally  compelled,
in the interest  of equalization  and diversity.  The  Court held  that the
FCC's fairness doctrine, under which broadcasting stations are to present
discussions  of public issues and to assure fair coverage  for each  side,171
requires  that licensees  make  free  reply  time available.1 72  Indeed,  "the
right of free speech of a broadcaster, the user of a sound  truck, or any
other individual does not embrace a right to snuff out the free speech of
others." 173  For the Court, the fairness  doctrine would  "enhance  rather
than abridge the freedoms  of speech  and press,"' 174 for free  expression
would not be served by "unlimited  private censorship operating  in a me-
dium not open to all."' 175  The Court continued:
There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Govern-
ment from requiring a licensee  to share his frequency with others and
to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with  obligations to present
those views and voices which are representative of his community and
which would  otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves. 176
Red Lion  and Buckley  are  in  considerable  tension.  Red Lion  is
based on an understanding that government regulation intended to pro-
mote equality may further first amendment interests-indeed,  may even
be required by them.  Buckley treats such efforts as constitutionally pro-
scribed.  In this respect, Buckley may be associated with a conception  of
constitutional  law  that was  most  clearly  developed  in Lochner v. New
York. 177  In Lochner, the Court understood the common law system, the
"private"  status quo, as natural and inviolate.  Government readjustment
of common law entitlements  could be understood as a "taking"  from A
to give to B,  a taking for which the public rather than A  should pay. 178
This redistribution  of entitlements did not fall within the range  of gov-
ernment ends permissible under the police power.
The  same  understanding  underlies  Buckley.  Disparities  in  power
that come from the private sphere should be taken as natural and invio-
170.  395 U.S.  367 (1969).
171.  See  47 C.F.R. §§  73.1910-1940 (1985).
172.  Red Lion, 395  U.S. at 385-86, 391-92.
173.  Id. at 387.
174.  Id. at  375.
175.  Id. at 392.
176.  Id. at 389.
177.  198 U.S. 45  (1905).  See generally Sunstein,  Lochner's  Legacy, 87  COLUM.  L. REV.  (1987)
(forthcoming).
178.  See Sunstein, supra note  130, at 1717.
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late;  government  efforts to redress those disparities are unconstitutional
because the end  is itself illegitimate.  In the post-Lochner period,  how-
ever,  the notion that reallocation  of common  law  rights  represents  an
impermissible  end  seems  absurd.  The common  law system itself is  re-
garded  as a regulatory scheme with no prepolitical status.  A decision to
reallocate entitlements or to redistribute  resources might thus be under-
stood as a legitimate effort to promote the public good, falling comforta-
bly within the police power. 179  This is the accepted interpretation of the
due process clause; under the first amendment, a different understanding
prevails.
Of course, both Red Lion and Buckley were shaped at least in part
by  the  particular context  and are  of uncertain  relevance  to the debate
surrounding  antipornography  regulation.  Red Lion's holding may have
depended  on the special  qualities of the broadcast  media, especially  the
perceived  limited ability of the media to carry alternative sources of in-
formation.  Though  this  perception may be  faulty, 18 0  it can be  argued
that Red Lion's reach is limited to the broadcast media.181  In Buckley,
meanwhile, the arguments on both sides were based on large part on the
fact that it involved money.  Thus one's view about Buckley  may be lim-
ited to those government  acts that regulate financial expenditure. 182
In one  sense  the antipornography  argument,  carried to its logical
extreme, goes further even than the lower court decision in Buckley, be-
cause antipornography legislation might be thought to establish a prece-
dent  for  regulation  whenever  it  is  necessary  to  protect  the powerless
against  the operation  of a free  expression  regime.  But  a fundamental
limitation  is that antipornography  legislation  would apply  only to low-
179.  See Kennedy, supra note  158,  at 1777; Sunstein,  supra note  130, at 1718.
180.  See Coase, The Federal  Communications  Commission, 2 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 17-24 (1959)  (ar-
guing that free market allocation of available frequencies  would increase both range  and amount of
information available); Spitzer,  Controlling  the Content of Print  and Broadcast,  58  S. CAL.  L. REv.
1351,  1394  (1985)  ("[I]f there are  many competing  outlets  the market will  produce a substantial
diversity of offerings").
181.  See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.  241,  245 (1974)  (state statute guar-
anteeing political  candidates  right to reply to adverse  editorials violated constitutional  guarantees);
Bollinger,  Freedom of the Press and Public Access:  Toward a Theory of Partial  Regulation of the
Mass Media, 75  MICH. L. REv.  1, 6-7  (1976)  (interpreting Red Lion as establishing  a special first
amendment  regime for the broadcast media).  Furthermore, some have questioned the soundness of
the decision  in the first place.  See Krattenmaker & Powe, The Fairness  Doctrine Today:  A  Constitu-
tional Curiosity and an Impossible Dream, 1985  DUKE  L.J.  151,  176  (contending that the  fairness
doctrine "violates  every  accepted principle  of first amendment jurisprudence,  represents  ill-advised
and inefficacious  regulatory policy, and has  no ascertainable content").
182.  See Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?,  85 YALE  L.J.  1001,  1008-10
(1976)  (arguing that limitations on campaign  spending are manageable  content-neutral  controls  on
political  abuses).
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value  speech.183  This  limited  applicability,  furthermore,  distinguishes
antipornography legislation from the high-speech regulation struck down
in Buckley.  One can accept arguments from  substantive powerlessness
in the antipornography  context without accepting them generally.
But the foregoing discussion does not explain  why the Court main-
tains a Lochner-like approach to the first amendment even though it has
rejected the same approach with respect to the due process clause.  Ap-
peal to the text of the respective provisions does not suffice,  for govern-
ment action like that in Buckley  could be regarded as promoting rather
than abridging  freedom  of speech.  Nor does  the aggressiveness  of the
judicial role  under Lochner explain the  difference,  for in Buckley  and
Hudnut, the Court also invalidated legislation enacted by the politically
accountable branches.
The Lochner-like approach  that underlies  the Court's rejection  of
attempts  to promote first  amendment  values  through  the regulation  of
powerful  private  actors  instead  appears  to  stem  from  an  amalgam  of
three factors:  (1) the view that disparities in private power do not signifi-
cantly interfere with a well-fnctioning system of free expression;  (2) the
perception  that  if government  is  permitted  to  intervene  on  behalf  of
groups deemed powerless,  lines will be impossible to  draw, and govern-
ment will be licensed to act for impermissible reasons; and  (3)  the belief
that if some people-even if they have disproportionate power-are not
permitted to speak, a genuine impairment of freedom results, even if that
impairment is made in the interest of equality.
These concerns raise large and difficult issues that can be addressed
only briefly and tentatively  here.  First, it is fanciful to suggest that dis-
parities in private power do not undermine the operation of a system  of
free expression.  When those  disparities are large,  the principal  goals of
free speech will be subverted unless the government intervenes  with cor-
rective  measures.'84  The  guarantee of free speech is  designed largely  to
combat the evils  of factional tyranny and self-interested  representation,
and to ensure that government outcomes are the product of some form of
deliberation  on the part of the citizenry. 1 8 5  If portions  of the  citizenry
are  powerless  and  for that reason  unable  to  participate  in  deliberative
183.  See supra notes 80-111  and  accompanying text.
184.  Market failure is a justification for government action in other contexts.  See Hawaii Hous,
Auth. v. Midkif,  467 U.S. 229, 242  (1984)  (condemnation  of lots by state housing authority  held  to
be proper  and rational  means  to correct  market  failure).  The notion-with  a broad definition  of
"market failure"-has been applied in the first amendment  area by some feminists.  See A. DWOR-
KIN, supra note 1, at 200-02.  But see Ingber, supra note 164, at 24 (obscenity law incompatible with
marketplace premise that alternative  views are not in themselves  harmful).
185.  Se ' Sunstein, supra note 99.
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processes,  free speech will not serve its goals. 186
There is, however, a legitimate fear that judicial  or legislative deci-
sions  about the relative  power possessed by various groups are likely to
be contingent  and unreliable.  Especially when  freedom of expression is
at stake, such contingency may be unacceptable.  The best guarantor of
freedom,  according to this view, is a general rule forbidding the consider-
ation of substantive power-not because this factor does not matter, and
not because the disparities are not real, but because the cost of allowing
the inquiry might be intolerable.1 87  This general rule is based in part on
the familiar fear of "slippery  slopes."  Judgments about who is powerful
and who  is not must refer  to some baseline;  they are highly manipula-
ble-because  of the lack  of consensus or the absence of clearly  defined
standards  on the issue-and they themselves  can be affected  by power.
In  light  of these  considerations,  it  may  be  best  to  avoid  the  inquiry
altogether.
Finally, a decision to silence the views of the powerful may well be
regarded as an infringement  upon freedom that ought to be weighed  in
the constitutional balance, even if the goal of equality might be promoted
by the infringement.  To some degree this argument stems from concerns
about the identity of the decisionmaker.  But to some degree it depends
as well on the understandable belief, underlying Buckley itself, that even
comparatively  well-off  people  have  a  right  to  complain  if they  are
silenced.
These  considerations  suggest  that as  a  general rule,  inquiries  into
substantive  powerlessness  should not be used to  defend  restrictions  on
expression.1 88  But the issue is a difficult one, and the tentative character
of the  conclusion  should  be  emphasized.  In Buckley,  Red Lion,  and
here, however, the argument can be limited to a narrow context.  As we
have seen, pornography  operates  at a subconscious  level;  its influence  is
hard to match through "more  speech."'189  Ideological counterargument
cannot easily compete with the process by which pornography communi-
cates its message.  Moreover,  pornography  is far afield  from the core of
the first amendment.  I conclude  that examining  substantive  differences
in power as a basis for regulation  of pornography is  appropriate in this
186.  For discussion of an "ideal  speech  situation," in which distortions are removed from com-
munication, see Habermas, Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence, 13 INQUIRY  360, 372
(1970)  (arguing that "the idea of truth ...  can only be analyzed with regard to consensus achieved in
unrestrained discourse").  See also Jacobs, Patterns  of Violence:  A Feminist  Perspective  on the Regu-
lation of  Pornography,  7 HARV.  WOMEN'S L.J. 5, 45  (1984) (presenting feminist view regarding need
for government suppression of pornography  as means to further  women's "right  to speech").
187.  See Ackerman, supra note 95,  at 731-40.
188.  Cf supra note  164.
189.  See supra notes  105-11  and accompanying  text.
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context, and helps the case for regulation, even if we ought to avoid such
an examination  as a general rule.190
In sum,  first  amendment  doctrine  reflects  a  strong version  of the
notion of neutral principles.  With the important exception of Red Lion,
issues  of substantive  power and powerlessness  are  avoided.  Despite  its
Lochner-like quality, this general  approach  is  sound.  But it poses  sub-
stantial disadvantages  as well  as benefits;  and in some narrow contexts,
its disadvantages are sufficiently  great, and its benefits sufficiently  doubt-
ful, to justify a departure from the general principle.  Regulation of por-
nography  is such a context.
V.  SLIPPERY SLOPES,  VAGUENESS,  AND  OVERBREADTH
Some of the most powerful objections to antipornography legislation
concern vagueness and overbreadth.  Even if a definition of pornography
identifies the specific class of materials with which one is most concerned,
there remains  the problem  of overinclusion-regulating  materials  that
have  some  social  value  and  that  are  unlikely to  produce  the  relevant
harm.  Three limiting strategies, therefore, might be helpful.
First,  it might be  desirable to  limit antipornography  legislation so
that it applies to work "taken  as a whole"  or at the very least protects
"isolated  passages"  in longer works.19 1  Some materials that have porno-
graphic  components  may  on  the whole  generate  little  of the  relevant
harm.  This might be the case, for example, where a motion picture con-
tains pornographic scenes  as part of a more general enterprise.  In such
circumstances  the low-value argument is more difficult  to make.  More-
over, the resulting  harm  may  be  insufficient  to justify  regulation,  and
such materials  are  less  likely  to have  a pernicious  conditioning  effect.
They are thus less likely to produce sexual violence.
Second, as under current obscenity law, the regulation could be lim-
190.  This conclusion,  however, is hardly an  endorsement of the  broader position  that the first
amendment should  be essentially  irrelevant  to the debate, because  it protects  those  who  "have"
speech against  those  who  "have not"  the power of speech.  See  Dworkin,  supra note  158,  at  19
("Protecting what they 'say' means protecting sexual exploitation....  Their rights of speech express
their rights over us."); Note, Patterns  of Violence:  A Feminist Perspective of the Regulation of Por
nography, 7  HARV.  WOMEN'S  L.L  5, 45  (1984)  ("Without  a right of equal  access to  free speech,
freedom  of speech  defined  only  in  terms of the  absence  of government  prohibitions is  primarily
beneficial  to those  who can  afford  it.").  My  purpose has been  to show that  pornography  can  be
regulated without doing violence to the first amendment  through a tight definition  of those matters
to be regulated.
191.  The absence of such a provision  in the Indianapolis  antipornography  ordinance was identi-
fied  as a constitutional  defect by the United  States Court of Appeals  for the Seventh  Circuit.  See
American  Booksellers Ass'n  v. Hudnut, 771  F.2d 323,  328  (7th  Cir. 1985),  aff'd, 106 S. Ct.  1172
(1986).
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ited to material devoid of serious social value. 192  Matters having serious
social value are, by definition,  excluded  from the category  of low-value
speech;  their regulation is thus to be tested by more stringent standards
which, for reasons suggested above, generally preclude regulation.  There
are  costs as well as benefits  associated with this limitation.193  Without
some  such  limitation,  however,  any  argument  for an  antipornography
legislation risks running afoul of competing  analogies.
The costs arise in those cases in which pornography  has been pro-
duced through coercive and abusive means.  Distribution of such mate-
rial may be regulable notwithstanding the value of the speech.194  When
regulation is based on harm, the social value of the material is ordinarily
irrelevant;  the  speaker  must  excise  the  offending  material,  and  is  not
given license to claim immunity on account of the general  value of the
communication.
195
Third, it may be desirable to limit regulation to motion pictures and
photography, and to exclude purely written materials.  The evidence sug-
gests that motion pictures and photography do the most to generate sex-
ual  violence;  the  data  are  more  obscure  with  respect  to  written
material.1 96  Moreover, the harm to women participating in the produc-
tion  of  pornography  is,  of  course,  limited  to  motion  pictures  and
photography.
Strategies of this sort suggest that it should be possible to draft  an
antipornography  ordinance that is sufficiently definite to withstand chal-
lenges of vagueness  and overbreadth.  But  one final  objection  remains.
That  objection  points  to  the  familiar  dangers  posed  by  the  "slippery
slope"-  dangers  about  which  we  are  rightly  concerned  in  the  first
amendment  context.197  The lines to which I have  referred thus far  are
not so crisp  as  to alleviate  all  fear of misapplication.  In light of these
considerations, it might be suggested that the disadvantages  of suppres-
192.  See Miller v. California,  413  U.S. 15,  24 (1973)  (requiring that state prohibition be limited
to materials that "do  not have serious literary, artistic, political,  or scientific value").  It is not alto-
gether clear, however,  that the "taken  as a whole"  and  the "serious  social value"  limitations  are
constitutionally  required.  In other areas-consider libel-the unprotected  speech is not immunized
by surrounding high-value  speech.
193.  See MacKinnon, supra note  7.
194.  This point was  recognized in Hudnut, 771  F.2d at 332.
195.  Cf New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,  736-37  (1971)  (White, J., concurring)
(publication  permitted despite the illegality of the transmittal of information in Pentagon Papers to
newspaper).
196.  See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying  text.
197.  See Blasi, The Pathological  Perspective and the First  Amendment,  85 COLUM.  L. REv.  449,
474-80 (1985)  (favoring outcome-determinative,  mechanical  standards and discouraging  rules that
would be vulnerable during "pathological"  times).
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sion are simply too great to justify the acceptance of what has become  a
relatively elaborate  and complex set of doctrinal distinctions.
Whether this argument, like others premised  on slippery-slope  con-
cerns,  is  persuasive  depends  on two  factors.  The  first  is  whether  the
problem at issue is a genuine one.  If one believes that pornography is  a
legitimate source of concern, the possibility of misapplication will be rele-
vant but not decisive.  If one believes  that pornography  is not a serious
social  problem,  or  that  the  problem  can  be  solved  through  "more
speech,"  the  dangers  of misapplication  support rejecting  the argument
entirely.  The case  for antipornography  legislation  thus depends  on  si-
multaneous beliefs that pornography produces significant harms and that
those  harms  cannot be  alleviated  through  public  debate  alone.  I have
offered arguments  suggesting that both of these beliefs are true.' 98
The second factor  is the possibility  of holding the line.  If one be-
lieves  that  pornography  is  genuinely  indistinguishable  from  forms  of
speech that merit protection-either because of their value or because of
their failure to produce harm-the argument premised on slippery-slope
concerns  will  be  quite  powerful.  But  the rationale  suggested  here  is
designed to diminish  the likelihood  of misapplication.  Pornography has
special  characteristics  with respect both to its effects and to the harm it
produces.  With art and literature generally, attempts to regulate would
be unlikely to be justifiable by reference either to low-value analysis or to
harms,  and both justifications are necessary  under the approach  set out
here.  The traditional lawyers' facility in identifying the difficult interme-
diate case, or the seemingly contrary hypothetical, sometimes operates as
an obstacle to legislation that is on balance highly desirable.  In the first
amendment setting, fears about difficult intermediate cases and misappli-
cation are generally salutary.  But at least in the context of pornography,
they have proved a barrier to legislation that would in all likelihood  do
more good than harm.
VI.  CONCLUSION
Antipornography  legislation  tests  constitutional  doctrine  in  unex-
pected ways-the difference between low- and high-value  speech, the re-
lationship  between  sexual  equality  and  the  first  amendment,  the
distinction  between  viewpoint-based  and  viewpoint-neutral  regulation,
and the commitment to neutrality in both weak and strong senses are all
drawn into question by the recent proposals.
It is possible, however, to defend such legislation within the confines
of conventional  doctrine.  Pornography  falls within the  general  class of
198.  See supra notes  48-79,  155 and accompanying  text.
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low-value expression,  and the harm it produces is sufficient to justify reg-
ulation of that expression.  One can reach this conclusion  without com-
promising other well-accepted doctrines.  The most troubling issue is that
of viewpoint-neutrality,  but other seemingly viewpoint-based restrictions
are sometimes upheld when sufficient harm is present.  Antipornography
legislation is based on harm rather than viewpoint.  Furthermore, to the
extent  that  antipornography  legislation  might  be  deemed  viewpoint-
based, its status as such is less troubling in light of the peculiar character
of the method by which the pornographic  "message"  is communicated.
I conclude that the skepticism about antipornography  legislation  is
based on a simultaneous  undervaluation  of the harm pornography pro-
duces,  a  misapplication  of conventional  doctrines  requiring viewpoint-
neutrality, and-perhaps  most important-an overvaluation  of the dan-
gers  posed  by  generating  a  somewhat  different  category  of regulable
speech bound to have some definitional vagueness.  At least as the notion
is used here,  antipornography  legislation  should produce  important so-
cial benefits without posing significant threats to a well-functioning  sys-
tem of free expression.
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